Σάββατο, 30 Ιουλίου 2016

Οι Αρχιτέκτονες της Al-Qaeda και του ISIS

Περιεχόμενα

1979: Η Εισβολή των Σοβιετικών στο Αφγανιστάν

2003: Η Εισβολή των ΗΠΑ στο Ιράκ

1989: Ο Αρχηγός της Al-Qaeda του Ιράκ φτάνει στο Πακιστάν

2003: Ο Αρχιτέκτονας του Ισλαμικού Κράτους



1979: Η Εισβολή των Σοβιετικών στο Αφγανιστάν

Το 1979 ήταν μία σημαδιακή χρονιά για την Μέση Ανατολή. Το 1970 ο αντιπρόεδρος του Γκαμάλ Νάσερ, ο Anwar Sadat, διαδέχθηκε στην εξουσία τον Γκαμάλ Νάσερ μετά τον θάνατο του τελευταίου. Το 1973 ο Σαντάτ πήγε μαζί με την Συρία σε έναν πόλεμο με το Ισραήλ (Πόλεμος του Yom Kippur).

Μετά την ήττα από το Ισραήλ στον πόλεμο του 1973, ο Sadat άρχισε σταδιακά να μεταφέρει την Αίγυπτο στην σφαίρα επιρροής των ΗΠΑ, και η Αίγυπτος άρχισε να λαμβάνει μεγάλες οικονομικές ενισχύσεις από τις ΗΠΑ. Το 1979 αυτή η γεωπολιτική μετατόπιση επισημοποιήθηκε με την υπογραφή της συνθήκης ειρήνης ανάμεσα στην Αίγυπτο και το Ισραήλ. Από τότε η Αίγυπτος λαμβάνει την δεύτερη μεγαλύτερη στρατιωτική βοήθεια από τις ΗΠΑ, πίσω μόνο από το Ισραήλ.

Την μετατόπιση της Αιγύπτου στο στρατόπεδο της Δύσης ο Σαντάτ θα το πληρώσει με την ζωή του το 1981, οπότε και θα τον δολοφονήσουν οι Αιγύπτιοι Ισλαμιστές, φαντάζομαι με την υποστήριξη του Καντάφι της Λιβύης, του Χαφέζ Άσαντ της Συρίας και των Ιρανών. Φαντάζομαι λέω, δεν το γνωρίζω. Ίσως να κάνω και λάθος, αλλά το σίγουρο είναι για να τιμήσουν τον δολοφόνο οι Ιρανοί έδωσαν το όνομα του δολοφόνου του Σαντάτ σε έναν δρόμου του Ιράν.

Χρειάστηκε να έρθει το 2012, και να πάρει την εξουσία στην Αίγυπτο η Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα, με την βοήθεια της Τουρκίας, του Κατάρ, του Ιράν και του Σουδάν, για να επισκεφθεί Ιρανός Πρόεδρος την Αίγυπτο. Ο οποίος Αιγύπτιος Πρόεδρος ανατράπηκε έναν χρόνο αργότερα από τους Αιγύπτιους σοσιαλιστές εθνικιστές, με την υποστήριξη της Σαουδικής Αραβίας και των Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων, κάτι που οδήγησε στην μεγάλη ρήξη Τουρκίας-Σαουδικής Αραβίας για το θέμα της Μουσουλμανικής Αδελφότητας.

Η απώλεια της Αιγύπτου την δεκαετία του 70 στοίχισε πάρα πολύ στους Σοβιετικούς, γιατί η Αίγυπτος ήταν, και παραμένει, μία χώρα τεράστιας στρατηγικής σημασίας.

Το 1979 οι Ισλαμιστές στο Ιράν θα ανατρέψουν τον φιλοδυτικό μονάρχη του Ιράν, και θα μετατρέψουν το Ιράν σε Ισλαμική Δημοκρατία. Οι Αμερικανοί κερδίζουν την Αίγυπτο και χάνουν το Ιράν.

Οι Αμερικανοί, με το Δόγμα Κάρτερ (Carter Doctrine) το 1980 θα δηλώσουν ότι αν θιγούν τα συμφέροντα τους στον Περσικό Κόλπο θα ξεκινήσουν πόλεμο. Αυτό πρακτικά σημαίνει ότι αν κάποιος προσπαθήσει να πάρει την Σαουδική Αραβία από την σφαίρα επιρροής των ΗΠΑ, ή αν κάποιος ξεκινήσει πόλεμο με την Σαουδική Αραβία, θα πάει σε πόλεμο και με τις ΗΠΑ. Ή ακόμη πιο σωστά σημαίνει ότι το πετρέλαιο της Σαουδικής Αραβίας δεν θα φύγει από την σφαίρα επιρροής των ΗΠΑ.

Χάρτης




Οι Σοβιετικοί, έχοντας δει τους σοσιαλιστές της Αιγύπτου να τους γυρνάνε την πλάτη και να συμμαχούν με τους Αμερικανούς, θεωρούν ότι δεν μπορούν να βασίζονται πλέον σε σοσιαλιστές εθνικιστές Άραβες. Έχοντας επίσης δει το Ιράν να πέφτει το 1979, έχουν αυξημένη αυτοπεποίθηση, και θεωρούν ότι πρέπει να ακολουθήσουν μία πιο επιθετική πολιτική. Έτσι το 1979 οι Σοβιετικοί εισβάλλουν στο Αφγανιστάν, και ανεβάζουν στην εξουσία τους Κομμουνιστές Αφγανούς.

Οι Πακιστανοί θεωρούν ότι αν οι Σοβιετικοί κυβερνούν στο Αφγανιστάν δεν θα αργήσει να έρθει η ώρα που οι Αφγανοί θα ζητήσουν να πάρουν το Πακιστανικό Pashtunistan, που έτσι κι αλλιώς ποτέ δεν έπαψαν να διεκδικούν οι Αφγανοί. Οι Pashtuns αποτελούν την πλειοψηφία στο Αφγανιστάν, ενώ στο στο Πακιστάν είναι με διαφορά δεύτεροι, με τους Πακιστανούς να είναι πρώτοι. Ο Πακιστανικός στρατός αποτελείται από Punjabis σχεδόν εξολοκλήρου. Τα στελέχη των Ταλιμπάν προέρχονται από τους Pashtuns, και με τους Αφγανούς Ταλιμπάν οι Πακιστανοί χτυπούν τους αντιπάλους τους στο Αφγανιστάν, και με τους Πακιστανούς Ταλιμπάν οι αντίπαλοι των Πακιστανών Punjabis χτυπούν τους Punjabis στο Πακιστάν.

Χάρτης Pashtunistan



Για το Pasthunistan βλέπε “Τα 2 Πρόσωπα των Ταλιμπάν”
                          
Οι Αμερικανοί και οι Άραβες του Κόλπου αρχίζουν να χρηματοδοτούν Ισλαμιστές, οι οποίοι πηγαίνουν στο Πακιστάν, εκπαιδεύονται από τους Πακιστανούς, και πολεμούν τους Σοβιετικούς στο Αφγανιστάν.

Οι Κινέζοι αρχίζουν να στέλνουν Ουιγούρους στο Πακιστάν, από την Μουσουλμανική επαρχία τους Xin Jiang, προκειμένου το Πακιστάν να τους εκπαιδεύσει και να πολεμήσουν και αυτοί τους Σοβιετικούς. Οι Σοβιετικοί έχουν ήδη πολύ στρατό στα σύνορα με την Κίνα (Καζακστάν και Μογγολία), και οι Κινέζοι είναι πολύ δυσαρεστημένοι με την κάθοδο των Σοβιετικών στο Αφγανιστάν.

Οι Ιρανοί Ισλαμιστές, που έχουν πάρει την εξουσία το 1979, δεν δέχονται να συμμετάσχουν στο μέτωπο ΗΠΑ-Σαουδικής Αραβίας, αλλά χρηματοδοτούν από μόνοι τους Σιίτες Ισλαμιστές του Αφγανιστάν εναντίον των Σοβιετικών. Οι Σοβιετικοί είναι στενοί σύμμαχοι του Σαντάμ Χουσέιν, και οι Ιρανοί με τους Ιρακινούς πάνε σε έναν μεγάλο πόλεμο την περίοδο 1980-1988, με  τον Σαντάμ να προσπαθεί να πάρει τις πλούσιες σε πετρέλαιο περιοχές του νοτιοδυτικού Ιράν, στις οποίες οι Άραβες είναι πλειοψηφία.

Χάρτης



Μετά την εισβολή των Σοβιετικών στον Μουσουλμανικό κόσμο υπάρχει ενθουσιασμός. Όλοι οι καλοί Μουσουλμάνοι θέλουν να πάνε στο Αφγανιστάν και να σκοτώσουν τους απίστους που έκαναν την εισβολή. Ξεκινάει λοιπόν η Τζιχάντ εναντίον των Σοβιετικών, με υποστήριξη και από τους Αμερικανούς και από τους Άραβες και από τους Ιρανούς και από τους Κινέζους, αλλά στην πρώτη γραμμή βρίσκονται οι Αμερικανοί με τους Σαουδάραβες, που είναι οι δύο στενότεροι σύμμαχοι.

Χάρτης Η Σοβιετική Εισβολή και η Τζιχάντ εναντίον των Σοβιετικών



2003: Η Εισβολή των ΗΠΑ στο Ιράκ

Το 2003 οι Αμερικανοί εισβάλλουν στο Ιράκ. Οι Αμερικανοί έχουν δει το 2002 τους Τούρκους Ισλαμιστές να παίρνουν την εξουσία από τους Κεμαλικούς, με την βοήθεια του Ιράν, πιστεύω και με την βοήθεια της Ρωσίας.

Οι Κεμαλικοί είναι στενοί σύμμαχοι των ΗΠΑ, και έχουν φέρει την Τουρκία στον σκληρό πυρήνα της Δύσης και την έχουν κάνει πανίσχυρη. Με την άνοδο των Ισλαμιστών η Τουρκία θα απομακρυνθεί από την Δύση, θα αποδυναμωθεί, και δείτε σήμερα ποια Τουρκία έχουν να αντιμετωπίσουν οι Ρώσοι και οι Ιρανοί, και συγκρίνετε αυτή την Τουρκία με την πανίσχυρη Τουρκία των Κεμαλικών. Για να καταλαβαίνουμε πόσο σημαντικό είναι να υποστηρίζεις τις κατάλληλες δυνάμεις σε χώρες αντιπάλους, και να καταλάβουμε γιατί το τουρκικό προξενείο υποστηρίζει τόσο πολύ τους Κομμουνιστές στην Ελλάδα.
Οι Αμερικανοί βλέπουν την Τουρκία να στρέφεται προς την Ρωσία για φτηνό φυσικό αέριο, βλέπουν την Σαουδική Αραβία να στρέφεται στην Κίνα για να προωθήσει τις εξαγωγές της, και βλέπουν το Ιράν και το Ιράν να υποστηρίζουν τρομοκρατικές επιθέσεις εναντίον των ΗΠΑ, ακόμη και με την βοήθεια των Αράβων συμμάχων των Αμερικανών.

Οι Αμερικανοί αποφασίζουν να ελευθερώσουν την Σιιτική πλειοψηφία του Ιράκ (65%) από την βάρβαρη Σουνιτική μειοψηφία του Σαντάμ (15%), η οποία διοικεί βάρβαρα εις βάρος των Σιιτών και των Κούρδων του Ιράκ. Ο Σαντάμ έχει έναν Σουνιτικό στρατό 250 χιλιάδων ανδρών.

Χάρτης Οι Σύμμαχοι και οι Εχθροί των ΗΠΑ



Το σχέδιο είναι ότι οι Σιίτες και οι Κούρδοι του Ιράκ, που αποτελούν το 80-85% του πληθυσμούς, θα δεχτούν τους Αμερικανούς ως απελευθερωτές, και το Ιράκ θα γίνει ένας στενός σύμμαχος των ΗΠΑ. Είναι ένα λογικό σχέδιο που θεωρητικά θα είναι πολύ εύκολο να πετύχει.

Χάρτης Κουρδιστάν



Οι Ιρανοί δεν προφανώς δεν ήθελαν να συμμαχήσουν οι Αμερικανοί με τους Σιίτες του Ιράκ, τους οποίους παραδοσιακά οι Ιρανοί ξεσήκωναν εναντίον του Σαντάμ, και το τελευταίο πράγμα που ήθελαν ήταν να έχουν τους Αμερικανούς δίπλα τους.

Οι Σαουδάραβες δεν ήθελαν τους Σιίτες στην εξουσία του Ιράκ, γιατί ο Σαντάμ, αν και εχθρός τους, κρατούσε μακριά από την Σαουδική Αραβία τους Ιρανούς. Οι Άραβες του Περσικού Κόλπου είδαν την επίθεση των ΗΠΑ στον Σαντάμ ως μία επίθεση και σε αυτούς.

Επίσης, ούτε οι Ιρανοί ούτε οι Σαουδάραβες ήθελαν το πετρέλαιο του Ιράκ να αρχίσει να ρέει στις αγορές.

Οι Τούρκοι είδαν το πετρέλαιο του Βορείου Ιράκ, το οποίο τροφοδοτεί τον αγωγό Kirkuk-Ceyhan, να περνάει στα χέρια των Κούρδων του Ιράκ. Όσο ο Σαντάμ ήταν στην εξουσία οι Τούρκοι αγόραζαν το πετρέλαιο του Βορείου Ιράκ σε πολύ καλές τιμές, αφού η Συρία και το Ιράν ήταν εχθροί του Σαντάμ.

Επίσης, ο έλεγχος του πετρελαίου του Ιρακινού Κουρδιστάν από τους Κούρδους ενισχύει τους Κούρδους οικονομικά, και τους επιτρέπει να πιστέψουν στην δημιουργία ενός ανεξάρτητου κράτους, κάτι που οι Δυτικοί ήθελαν από την εποχή του Α Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου.

Για να καθησυχάσει ο Τζορτζ Μπούς τους Τούρκους αναφέρεται στο PKK ως ο “κοινός μας εχθρός”. Και πράγματι το PKK είναι ο κοινός εχθρός των ΗΠΑ και της Τουρκίας, αλλά οι Κούρδοι είναι συγκοινωνούντα δοχεία, και οι ανησυχίες των Τούρκων είναι απόλυτα δικαιολογημένες.

Οι Αλαουίτες του Άσαντ, που επίσης είναι μία μειοψηφία που κυβερνά δικτατορικά την Σουνιτική πλειοψηφία και τους Κούρδους της Συρίας, θεώρησαν ότι ίσως να έρθει η δική τους σειρά μετά τον Σαντάμ. Αυτό θα ήταν τεράστιο πρόβλημα και για τους Ρώσους και για τους Ιρανούς.

Ο Άσαντ και η Συρία θα λειτουργήσουν το 2003 εναντίον των Αμερικανών όπως το Πακιστάν λειτούργησε το 1979 εναντίον των Σοβιετικών. Όπως και το 1979 υπάρχει ενθουσιασμός στον Μουσουλμανικό κόσμο, και όλοι οι καλοί Μουσουλμάνοι θέλουν να σκοτώσουν τους απίστους που εισέβαλλαν στην γη που βρίσκεται ανάμεσα στους δύο ποταμούς. Να θυμίσω ότι στο Ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος έδωσε την χαριστική βολή στους Πέρσες, και αμέσως μετά μπήκε και κατέκτησε την Περσία, τιμωρώντας τους Πέρσες για τις Περσικές εκστρατείες στην Ελλάδα τον προηγούμενο αιώνα. Πολλά από τα λάφυρα που πήρε ο Αλέξανδρς ήταν λάφυρα που οι Πέρσες είχαν πάρει από την Ελλάδα τον προηγούμενο αιώνα.

Ο Άσαντ ανοίγει τα σύνορα της Συρίας για να μπούνε στο Ιράκ τζιχαντιστές από όλο τον κόσμο. Στο Ιράκ θα γίνουν οι πιο απίστευτες συμμαχίες. Οι στρατηγοί του Άσαντ θα συνεργάζονται με τους πρώην εχθρούς τους, τους στρατηγούς του Σαντάμ, οι στρατηγοί του Σαντάμ θα συνεργάζονται με τους στρατηγούς του Ιράν, οι Σύριοι και οι Ιρανοί θα συνεργάζονται με τους Άραβες του Κόλπου, και όλες αυτές οι διεφθαρμένες ελίτ ετοιμάζονται να ξεκινήσουν τον ιερό πόλεμο εναντίον των Χριστιανών απίστων που βεβήλωσαν τον Μουσουλμανικό κόσμο και απείλησαν τα συμφέροντα τους.

 Και ο Άσαντ, και οι Πέρσες του Κόλπου, και το Ιράν, θα αρχίσουν να βάζουν μέσα στο Ιράκ ότι μαχητές μπορούν να βρουν για να χτυπήσουν τους Αμερικανούς. Η Σαουδική Αραβία, το Κατάρ, τα ΗΑΕ, το Κουβέιτ, θα αρχίσουν να μοιράζουν άφθονο χρήμα στους Τζιχαντιστές που χτυπάνε τους Αμερικανούς στο Ιράκ.

Έτσι, ενώ θεωρητικά φαινόταν παιχνιδάκι να δημιουργήσουν οι Αμερικανοί μία υποδειγματική δημοκρατία στο Ιράκ, αφού το 85% του πληθυσμού θα έπρεπε να τους αντιμετωπίζει ως απελευθερωτές, όλες οι γειτονικές Μουσουλμανικές χώρες, προφανώς και με την υποστήριξη των Ρώσων και των Τούρκων, ξεκινούν στο Ιράκ μία Τζιχάντ εναντίον των Αμερικανών.

Οι Τούρκοι δεν επέτρεψαν στους Αμερικανούς να χρησιμοποιήσουν τις Τουρκικές βάσεις κατά την επίθεση τους, και ο Τούρκος υπεύθυνος για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα δήλωσε ότι αυτό που κάνουν οι Αμερικανοί στο Ιράκ είναι γενοκτονία, και τους παρομοίασε με τον Χίτλερ.

Χαρακτηριστικό είναι ότι όταν οι  Αμερικανοί συνέλλαβαν μαζί με τους Κούρδους του Ιράκ κάποιους Τούρκους στρατιώτες στο Ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν, τους φόρεσαν κουκούλες, κάτι που συνηθίζεται για τους αιχμαλώτους της Al-Qaeda. Αντιμετώπισαν οι Αμερικανοί τους Τούρκους στρατιώτες σαν να ήταν μέλη της Al-Qaeda, βάζοντας τον Τουρκικό στρατό στο ίδιο καζάνι με την Al-Qaeda.

Η δημιουργία ενός δημοκρατικού Ιράκ μοιάζει σήμερα να είνα ένα σενάριο επιστημονικής φαντασίας. Το να δημιουργήσουν οι Αμερικανοί μία υποδειγματική δημοκρατία στο Ιράκ, την οποία θα ζήλευαν οι Μουσουλμάνοι όλου του κόσμου, είναι το τελευταίο πράγμα στον κόσμο που θέλουν οι Άραβες, οι Ιρανοί, οι Τούρκοι και οι Πακιστανοί.

Δεν υπάρχει καμία δυτικού τύπου χώρα στον Μουσουλμανικό κόσμο. Η Κεμαλική Τουρκία ήταν η μόνη Μουσουλμανική χώρα δυτικού τύπου, και αυτό τελείωσε με την άνοδο των Ισλαμιστών στην εξουσία το 2002. Kαι αυτές τις μέρες βλέπουμε ότι το 2016 είναι για την Τουρκία ότι ήταν το 1979 για το Ιράν, η μετατροπή της δηλαδή σε μία πραγματική Ισλαμική Δημοκρατία. Ελπίζω την έχθρα που πάει να δημιουργηθεί ανάμεσα στην Τουρκία και τις ΗΠΑ να τις εκμεταλλευτεί η Ελλάδα δημιουργώντας μία στενή συμμαχία με τις ΗΠΑ εναντίον της Τουρκίας.

1989: Ο Αρχηγός της Al-Qaeda του Ιράκ φτάνει στο Πακιστάν

Το 1989 φτάνει στο Πακιστάν ο Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Ο Abu Musab al-Zarqawi είναι ένας από τους πολλούς νεαρούς εγκληματίες που στέλνουν στο Πακιστάν οι Άραβες του Κόλπου και οι Αμερικανοί για να τους εκπαιδεύσουν οι Πακιστανοί και να τους στείλουν να πολεμήσουν τους Σοβιετικούς στο Αφγανιστάν.

Ο Zarqawi είναι ένας 23χρονος Ιορδανός, ο οποίος μπορεί να κινηθεί με μεγάλη άνεση στους κύκλους του υποκόσμου της Ιορδανίας, και έχει πολλές δίκες και κατηγορίες εναντίον του. Πολλοί εγκληματίες Άραβες βλέπουν την τρομοκρατία ως καριέρα. Όπως εσείς μπορεί να βλέπετε τις μεγάλες πολυεθνικές ως έναν τρόπο για να κάνετε καριέρα, πολλοί Άραβες βλέπουν την Al-Qaeda και τις άλλες τρομοκρατικές οργανώσεις ως πολυεθνικές που θα τους επιτρέψουν να κάνουν καριέρα και να αποκτήσουν χρήματα και δόξα.

Η αγορά εργασίας της τρομοκρατίας είναι όπως η αγορά εργασίας οποιουδήποτε άλλου τομέα, απλά οι άνθρωποι της τρομοκρατίας βγάζουν το ψωμί τους με πιο βίαιο τρόπο. Τα προσόντα που πρέπει να έχεις για να κάνεις καριέρα στην Ισλαμική τρομοκρατία είναι προφανώς να είσαι σκληρός, να μελετάς το Κοράνι, και να έχεις διασυνδέσεις Στην σοσιαλιστική τρομοκρατία φαντάζομαι ότι ισχύουν τα ίδια, αλλά αντί το Κοράνι πρέπει να μελετάς το Κεφάλαιο του Μαρξ.

Όταν φτάνει στο Αφγανιστάν ο Zarqawi ο πόλεμος είναι στο τέλος του. Οι Σοβιετικοί αποχωρούν το 1989 από το Αφγανιστάν. Όταν οι Σοβιετικοί θα αποχωρήσουν, οι Αμερικανοί και οι Σοβιετικοί θα συμφωνήσουν να μην ανακατευτούν, και οι Κινέζοι δεν θέλουν να ανακατευτούν σε έναν Μουσουλμανικό πόλεμο φοβούμενοι τις επιπτώσεις που κάτι τέτοιο θα έχει στην Μουσουλμανική τους επαρχία Xin Jiang. Έτσι θα ξεκινήσει ο πόλεμος ανάμεσα στο Πακιστάν και το Ιράν για επιρροή στο Αφγανιστάν, με το Πακιστάν να υποστηρίζεται από τους Άραβες του Κόλπου, και το Ιράν να υποστηρίζεται από την Ινδία.

Ο Zarqawi θα πάρει μέρος στους πολέμους αυτούς στο πλευρό των Αράβων και των Πακιστανών. Το 1993 θα αποχωρήσει από το Αφγανιστάν και θα επιστρέψει στην πατρίδα του την Ιορδανία, όπου θα φτιάξει την δική του τρομοκρατική οργάνωση, στόχος της οποίας είναι η ανατροπή του φιλο-Αμερικανού Βασιλιά της Ιορδανίας, ο οποίος όμως είναι και στενός σύμμαχος του Σαντάμ.

Ο Ιορδανός Βασιλιάς επιτρέπει στον Σαντάμ να βγαίνει στην Κόκκινη Θάλασσα  μέσω της Ιορδανίας, αποφεύγοντας τον Περσικό Κόλπο και το Ιράν, αποφεύγοντας επίσης την Συρία, έναν άλλο εχθρό του Σαντάμ. Ο Σαντάμ σε αντάλλαγμα δίνει στην Ιορδανία δωρεάν πετρέλαιο. Μην ξεχνάτε ότι ο Σαντάμ είναι εχθρός και της Σαουδικής Αραβίας, άσχετα αν συνεργάζονται εναντίον του Ιράν και της Συρίας.

Χάρτης Η Συμμαχία Ιορδανίας-Ιράκ



Χάρτης Η Συμμαχία Ιράκ-Ιορδανίας 2



Στο μεταξύ, το 1990, ο Σαντάμ Χουσέιν έχει εισβάλλει στο Κουβέιτ και  έχει πάρει τις τεράστιες πετρελαιοπηγές της χώρας, ελπίζοντας ότι οι Αμερικανοί και οι Σαουδάραβες δεν θα τολμήσουν να τον ανατρέψουν για να μην ενισχύσουν τους Ιρανούς. Αλλά ο Σαντάμ έκανε λάθος, οι Σαουδάραβες κάλεσαν τους Αμερικανούς στον Περσικό, και οι Αμερικανοί έδιωξαν τον Σαντάμ από το Κουβέιτ, χωρίς όμως πράγματι να τον ανατρέψουν, παρόλο που έφτασαν έξω από την Βαγδάτη.

Το θέμα όμως είναι το 1993, την χρονιά που ο Zarqawi θα γυρίσει στην Ιορδανία από το Αφγανιστάν, ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν τα έχει ήδη σπάσει με τον Σαουάραβα Βασιλιά, επειδή πολλοί Άραβες, και προφανώς και οι Ιρανοί, και ακόμη περισσότερο ο Σαντάμ, δεν ήθελαν να έρθουν οι Αμερικανοί στον Κόλπο. Ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν από το 1992 μέχρι το 1996 βρίσκεται στο Σουδάν, και η Αλ Κάιντα εκπαιδεύεται από την Χεζμπολάχ και το Ιράν. Βλέπε “Ο Άξονας Χεζμπολάχ – Al-Qaeda”.

Έχει σημασία αυτό, γιατί όταν ο Zarqawi πήγε στο Πακιστάν το 1989 εντάχθηκε σε ένα αμιγώς Αραβικό σύστημα. Από την στιγμή που ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν τα σπάει με τον Σαουδάραβα Βασιλιά, και αρχίζει η Al-Qaeda να εκπαιδεύεται από την Χεζμπολάχ, η Al-Qaeda είναι κάτι διαφορετικό. Ναι μεν το Ιράν είναι εχθρός της Al-Qaeda στο Αφγανιστάν, αλλά το Ιράν είναι και σύμμαχος της Al-Qaeda εναντίον του Σαουδάραβα Βασιλιά και των ΗΠΑ. Επομένως άλλο πράγμα ήταν οι Άραβες του Αφγανιστάν πριν την εισβολή του Σαντάμ στο Κουβέιτ, και άλλο μετά.

Η επιλογή του Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν από τους Σιίτες Ιρανούς και από τους Σιίτες Λιβανέζους της Χεζμπολάχ θεωρώ ότι δεν είναι σε καμία περίπτωση τυχαία, γιατί η μητέρα του Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν ήταν Σύρια Σιίτισα. Για την ακρίβεια ήταν Σύρια Αλαουίτισα, αλλά οι Αλαουίτες είναι μία σέχτα του Σιιτικού Ισλάμ.

Επομένως ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν, αν και Σουνίτης, ήταν μισός μισός, και ήταν ιδανικός για να είναι ο αρχηγός της οργάνωσης που αποτελούσε μία ανίερη συμμαχία ανάμεσα σε Σουνίτες Σαουδάραβες, Σουδανούς, Αιγυπτίους, Λιβύους, και τους Σιίτες της Χεζμπολάχ και τους Σιίτες του Ιράν, προκειμένου όλοι μαζί να χτυπούν τους Αμερικανούς και τον Σαουδάραβα Βασιλιά. Δυστυχώς στην Ελλάδα λόγω των ακροαριστερών δημοσιογράφων που λυμαίνονται τα ΜΜΕ ο κόσμος νομίζει ότι η Al-Qaeda είναι μία νατοϊκή οργάνωση.

Συριζαίος Ψηφοφόρος Φέρνει στο Φως Συνωμοσία



 Για την μητέρα του Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν βλέπε “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”, Αύγουστος 2006.

46η Παράγραφος
According to several different accounts of the meeting, bin Laden distrusted and disliked al-Zarqawi immediately. He suspected that the group of Jordanian prisoners with whom al-Zarqawi had been granted amnesty earlier in the year had been infiltrated by Jordanian intelligence; something similar had occurred not long before with a Jordanian jihadist cell that had come to Afghanistan. Bin Laden also disliked al-Zarqawi’s swagger and the green tattoos on his left hand, which he reportedly considered un-Islamic. Al-Zarqawi came across to bin Laden as aggressively ambitious, abrasive, and overbearing. His hatred of Shiites also seemed to bin Laden to be potentially divisive—which, of course, it was. (Bin Laden’s mother, to whom he remains close, is a Shiite, from the Alawites of Syria.)

Ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν ήταν πολύ ήπιος απέναντι στους Σιίτες. Δεν μπορεί να ήταν τυχαία η επιλογή του. Προφανώς όλοι ήθελαν να είναι αρχηγός της Al-Qaeda κάποιος που να μην προκαλεί το μένος ούτε των Σουνιτών ούτε των Σιιτών, και εφόσον η Al-Qaeda ήταν η Σουνιτική εκδοχή της Χεζμπολάχ, και έπρεπε ο επικεφαλής της να είναι Σουνίτης, τι καλύτερο από έναν Σαουάραβα που είχε Σιίτισα μητέρα? Έτσι θα ήταν ευχαριστημένοι και οι Σαουάραβες, που ήταν αυτοί που έδιναν κυρίως τα χρήματα, αλλά και οι Ιρανοί και η Χεζμπολάχ, που ήταν αυτοί που έβαζαν τα όπλα, την τεχνογνωσία και την αντικατασκοπία.

Ο Zarqawi θα μείνει στην φυλακή της Ιορδανίας από το 1993 μέχρι το 1999, και το 1999 θα γυρίσει στο Αφγανιστάν, όπου θα συναντηθεί με τον Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν. Οι δύο άνδρες δεν θα τα πάνε καλά από την αρχή γιατί στον μπιν Λάντεν δεν αρέσει το θράσος του Zarqawi. Ο Zarqawi λέει στον μπιν Λάντεν ότι είναι αμαρτία να βοηθάει τους Ταλιμπάν που σκοτώνουν άλλους Μουσουλμάνους, παίρνοντας ουσιαστικά στο Αφγανιστάν το μέρος της Northern Alliance, που είναι η σύμμαχος του Ιράν.

Ο Zarqawi είναι πολύ περισσότερο άνθρωπος των Ιρανών από τον Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν. Ο Οσάμα έχει την συμμαχία με το Ιράν αλλά θεωρεί το Ιράν αντίπαλο. Ο Zarqawi δεν δέχθηκε ποτέ να πολεμήσει με την Al-Qaeda και τους Ταλιμπάν εναντίον της Northern Alliance στο Αφγανιστάν την δεύτερη φορά που πήγε στο Αφγανιστάν. Μόνο όταν οι Αμερικανοί εισέβαλλαν στο Αφγανιστάν το 2001 ο Zarqawi πολέμησε μαζί με την Al-Qaeda, αλλά πολέμησε τους Αμερικανούς.

Γι’αυτό και το στρατόπεδο εκπαίδευσης που έδωσαν στον Zarqawi στο Αφγανιστάν για να εκπαιδεύει τους άντρες της οργάνωσης του ήταν στην περιοχή Herat, πολύ κοντά στα σύνορα με το Ιράν, ώστε ο Zarqawi να μπορεί να μπαινοβγαίνει από το Ιράν με την άνεση του.

Αυτό που έχει ενδιαφέρον είναι ότι ο Zarqawi ήταν φανατικά αντι-Σιίτης, αλλά αυτό δεν ενοχλούσε καθόλου τους Ιρανούς. Οι Ιρανοί χρειάζονται Σουνίτες που να μισούν τους Σιίτες για πολλούς λόγους. Για παράδειγμα τους Ιρανούς τους εξυπηρετεί να χτυπάει η Al-Qaeda τους Σιίτες της Σαουδικής Αραβίας, ώστε οι Σιίτες της Σαουδικής Αραβίας να νοιώθουν απροστάτευτοι και να ζητούν την προστασία του Ιράν. Γιατί προφανώς το Ιράν δεν το ενδιαφέρει η ασφάλεια των Αράβων Σιιτών του Ιράκ και της Σαουδικής Αραβίας, αλλά το να κάνει την δουλειά του χρησιμοποιώντας τους.

Επίσης υπήρχε πάντα η πιθανότητα να χτυπήσουν οι Αμερικανοί τον Σαντάμ, και σε αυτή την περίπτωση οι Ιρανοί χρειάζονταν κάποιον που θα οργάνωνε τους Σουνίτες του Ιράκ εναντίον των Σιιτών του Ιράκ που θα συνεργάζονταν με τους Αμερικανούς. Και πράγματι αυτό έστειλαν οι Ιρανοί τον Zarqawi να κάνει στο Ιράκ όταν μπήκαν οι Αμερικανοί.

Ο Zarqawi θα πολεμήσει τους Αμερικανούς στο Αφγανιστάν, και όταν πια οι Αμερικανοί θα διαλύσουν τους Ταλιμπάν ο Zarqawi θα μπει στο Ιράν, όπου θα μείνει για περίπου έναν χρόνο. Λίγο πριν οι Αμερικανοί χτυπήσουν τον Σαντάμ, ο Zarqawi θα μπει στο Ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν, και θα αρχίσει να συνεργάζεται με τους άντρες του Σαντάμ εναντίον των Κούρδων που συνεργάζονται με τους Αμερικανούς.

Αυτός είναι ο λόγος που οι Αμερικανοί κατηγορούσαν τον Σαντάμ ότι συνεργάζεται με την Al-Qaeda. Τον Zarqawi είχαν κυρίως στο μυαλό τους και αυτόν κατονόμαζαν. Ωστόσο προφανώς και οι Αμερικανοί γνώριζαν ότι ο Zarqawi ήταν άνθρωπος των Ιρανών και όχι άνθρωπος του Σαντάμ.

Λίγους μήνες πριν οι Αμερικανοί χτυπήσουν τον Σαντάμ, ο Zarqawi θα φύγει από το Ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν και θα μπει στο Ιράκ με τους άνδρες του για να ετοιμαστεί για τον πόλεμο. Είναι η εποχή που ο Σαντάμ, ξέροντας ότι θα χάσει τον πόλεμο που βλέπει να έρχεται, ετοιμάζει την χώρα για ανταρτοπόλεμο, και οι Τζιχαντιστές καταφθάνουν στο Ιράκ από παντού, ώστε να δημιουργηθούν πάρα πολλοί πυρήνες τρομοκρατίας.

Όταν ο Σαντάμ θα πέσει ο Zarqawi θα αρχίσει να κάνει τρομοκρατικές επιθέσεις εναντίον των Αμερικανών, αλλά και των Σιιτών που συνεργάζονται με τους Αμερικανούς. Η βασική αποστολή του Zarqawi είναι να δημιουργήσει έναν εμφύλιο στο Ιράκ ανάμεσα στους Σουνίτες και τους Σιίτες, ώστε να πάρει φωτιά το Ιράκ και να μην μπορούν οι Αμερικανοί να το σταθεροποιήσουν με τίποτα.

Από το 1999 ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν είχε πολλές φορές ζητήσει στον Zarqawi να ορκιστεί πίστη σε εκείνον και να ενταχθεί επισήμως στην Al-Qaeda, αλλά ο Zarqawi ποτέ δεν το είχε αποδεχτεί, επειδή ήθελε να έχει πολύ μεγαλύτερα περιθώρια αυτονομίας, και θεωρώ και επειδή ήταν πολύ περισσότερο άνθρωπος των Ιρανών. Ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν συνεργαζόταν με τους Ιρανούς, αλλά δεν ήταν άνθρωπος των Ιρανών. Ο Zarqawi ήταν νομίζω σε μεγάλο βαθμό άνθρωπος των Ιρανών.

Αλλά τελικά το 2004 ο Zarqawi θα ορκιστεί πίστη στον Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν και θα πάρει επισήμως το χρίσμα, και η οργάνωση του θα γίνει Al-Qaeda Iraq. Παρόλα αυτά θα κρατήσει μεγάλο βαθμό αυτονομίας, και θα είναι πολύ πιο άγριος από αυτό που απαιτεί ο Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν, και η συνεργασία τους θα παραμείνει προβληματική. Το 2006 οι Αμερικανοί καταφέρνουν να σκοτώσουν τον Zarqawi, ο οποίος όμως έχει καταφέρει να δημιουργήσει την Al-Qaeda του Ιράκ, από την οποία θα ξεπηδήσει το Ισλαμικό Κράτος του Ιράκ (ISI), και στην συνέχεια το Ισλαμικό Κράτος του Ιράκ και της Συρίας (ISIS), και στην συνέχεια το Ισλαμικό Κράτος (IS) το οποίο φιλοδοξεί να δημιουργήσει ένα χαλιφάτο στον Μουσουλμανικό κόσμο και όχι μόνο στο Ιράκ και την Συρία.

Για την καριέρα του Zarqawi βλέπε το άρθο του Αμερικανικού AtlanticThe Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”, Αύγουστος 2006.

To Atlantic είναι ένα από τα παλιότερα Αμερικανικά περιοδικά με περίπου 200 χρόνια ζωής.

2003: Ο Αρχιτέκτονας του Ισλαμικού Κράτους

Όταν οι Αμερικανοί θα νικήσουν τον Σαντάμ το 2003, θα διαλύσουν τον Σουνιτικό στρατό του Σαντάμ, ώστε να δημιουργήσουν έναν Σιιτικό στρατό, αφού ο σκοπός της επίθεσης είναι να έρθει στην εξουσία η Σιιτική πλειοψηφία που θα δει τους Αμερικανούς ως απελευθερωτές. Διακόσιες πενήντα χιλιάδες στρατιώτες και αξιωματικοί του Σαντάμ, οι οποίοι για δεκαετίες πολεμούν τους Αμερικανούς, θα βρεθούν άνεργοι και η ζωή τους θα ανατραπεί από την μία στιγμή στην άλλη.

Ο Hadji Bakr είναι ένας από τους αξιωματικούς των μυστικών υπηρεσιών του Σαντάμ, και όπως και πολλοί άλλοι συνάδελφοι του θα ενταχθεί στην Al-Qaeda του Zarqawi. Οι άνδρες του Σαντάμ ήταν εκπαιδευμένοι από τους Σοβιετικούς και την Κα Γκε Μπε, και φαντάζομαι ότι αυτή θα ήταν και η περίπτωση με τον Bakr. Ο Bakr έχει στενές επαφές με τα στελέχη των μυστικών υπηρεσιών του Άσαντ, και μαζί πολεμάνε τους Αμερικανούς.

Το 2003 τα πράγματα στο Ιράκ είναι σχετικά απλά, γιατί και οι Άραβες του Κόλπου και οι Ιρανοί και ο Άσαντ χτυπάνε τους Αμερικανούς, οι οποίοι βασίζονται στους Κούρδους. Πιστεύω ότι και οι Τούρκοι βλέπουν χαιρέκακα τις επιθέσεις εναντίον των ΗΠΑ στο Ιράκ, χωρίς να ξέρω αν και σε τι βαθμό τις υποστήριξαν.

Όταν όμως το 2011 οι Τούρκοι και οι Καταριανοί θα ξεσηκώσουν την Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα στην Συρία τα πράγματα θα μπλέξουν πάρα πολύ, και προφανώς στην Συρία οι Τούρκοι και οι Καταριανοί, σε αντίθεση με ότι συμβαίνει στο Ιράκ, θέλουν την υποστήριξη του ΝΑΤΟ εναντίον του Άσαντ και της Ρωσίας.

Οι Ρώσοι και ο Άσαντ θα αναθέσουν στον Hadji Bakr να σχεδιάσει έναν δίκτυο που κάποια στιγμή θα το εξελίξει στο Ισλαμικό κράτος, ώστε να ενώσει την Σουνιτική Συρία με το Σουνιτικό Ιράκ, ώστε να χτυπάνε στην Συρία τους αντάρτες που θα υποστηρίζονται από το ΝΑΤΟ, και στο Ιράκ να χτυπάνε τους Αμερικανούς.

Επίσης, η ενιαία περιοχή που θα δημιουργηθεί στην Σουνιτική Συρία και το Σουνιτικό Ιράκ, το λεγόμενο Ισλαμικό Κράτος του Ιράκ και της Συρίας, θα επιτρέψει στον Άσαντ και τους Ρώσους να χρησιμοποιούν τους Σουνίτες για να χτυπούν τους Αμερικανούς στο Ιράκ, αντί να τους χρησιμοποιούν οι Αμερικανοί για να χτυπούν τον Άσαντ στα παράλια της Συρίας.

Χάρτης Συρίας-Ιράκ




Ο Άσαντ έδωσε πετρελαιοπηγές της Συρίας στο Ισλαμιικό Κράτος, ώστε να έχει δικά του έσοδα, και για να δώσει και ένα κίνητρο στην Τουρκία να συνεργαστεί με τον ISIS. Ουσιαστικά ο Άσαντ και οι Ρώσοι έδωσαν στην Τουρκία την δυνατότητα να αγοράζει φτηνό πετρέλαιο από τον ISIS, που σημαίνει ότι της παραχώρησαν τις πετρελαιοπηγές της Σουνιτικής Συρίας και του Σουνιτικού Ιράκ, δίνοντας της το κίνητρο να μην χτυπάει την οργάνωση. Και πράγματι η Τουρκία άρχισε να έχει στενή συνεργασία με τον ISIS στην αγορά πετρελαίου, και μόνο όταν οι Τούρκοι έριξαν το Ρωσικό αεροπλάνο οι Ρώσοι έβαλαν τους άντρες του Άσαντ να πάρουν από τον ISIS κάποια πόστα που δεν επέτρεπαν πια στην Τουρκία να εισάγει το πετρέλαιο του ISIS.

Το πετρέλαιο μάλιστα από τον ISIS για τον Άσαντ το αγόραζε ένας επιχειρηματίας κοντά στον Πούτιν. Βλέπε Wall Street Journal “An Energy Mogul Becomes Entangled With Islamic State”, Μάιος 2016.

Οι Ιρανοί ακολούθησαν την ίδια στρατηγική με τους Ρώσους και τον Άσαντ, και υποτήριξαν την θυγατρική της Al-Qaeda στην Συρία, την al-Nusra, ώστε να καθαρίζει τους στρατιώτες που εκπαίδευαν στην Σουνιτική Συρία οι νατοϊκοί. Και η Nusra και ο ISIS της Συρίας δημιουργήθηκαν από αυτό που ήταν στο Ιράκ η Al-Qaeda του Ιράκ. Απλά ο ISIS είχε κάνει συμφωνία με τους Ρώσους και τον Άσαντ να μην χτυπάει τον Άσαντ, ενώ τα κεντρικά της Al-Qaeda ήθελαν να χτυπάνε τον Άσαντ, αφού η Al-Qaeda είναι Αραβική οργάνωση.

Έτσι αυτό που κάποτε ήταν ενιαίο μπλοκ στο Ιράκ, η Al-Qaeda Iraq, η οποία χτυπούσε τους Αμερικανούς και τους Σιίτες που συνεργάζονταν με τους Αμερικανούς, αλλά και τους Κούρδους, βρέθηκε διχασμένη στην Συρία, αφού οι Άραβες του Κόλπου και οι Τούρκοι ήθελαν να φύγει ο Άσαντ, ενώ οι Ρώσοι και οι Ιρανοί ήθελαν να τον κρατήσουν στην θέση του.

Η κεντρική ιδέα είναι ότι ο πόλεμος στο Ιράκ και την Συρία είναι δύο διαφορετικοί πόλεμοι, και γι’αυτό και βλέπετε τις τρομοκρατικές οργανώσεις να φέρονται με τόσο περίεργο τρόπο. Στην Συρία είναι όλοι εναντίον των Αμερικανών και των Κούρδων, ενώ στην Συρία είναι Τούρκοι-Καταριανοί εναντίον Ρώσων-Ιρανών. Στην πορεία ξέσπασε και ο πόλεμος Τουρκίας-Σαουδικής Αραβίας επειδή η Σαουδική Αραβία έφαγε την Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα στην Αίγυπτο και δεν ήθελε την Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα στην Συρία.

Οι Ρώσοι και ο Άσαντ είχαν μία πολύ έξυπνη ιδέα, και αυτή η ιδέα ήταν να δημιουργήσουν ένα Ισλαμικό Κράτος, χωρίς εθνική ταυτότητα, ώστε να ενώσουν οι αξιωματικοί του Σαντάμ Χουσέιν την Σουνιτική Συρία και το Σουνιτικό Ιράκ, και αντί οι Αμερικανοί να χτυπάνε στην μία άκρη τον Άσαντ να χτυπάει ο Άσαντ τους Αμερικανούς στην άλλη άκρη.

Χάρτης  Το σχέδιο του Ισλαμικού Κράτους





Προφανώς οι Ρώσοι και ο Άσαντ ήξεραν ότι στον ISIS θα αρχίσει να αποκτά επιρροή και η Τουρκία και οι Άραβες του Κόλπου, και αργά η γρήγορα θα τον βρουν και αυτόν μπροστά τους. Μέχρι τότε όμως το ΝΑΤΟ δεν μπορεί να αποκτήσει πατήματα στην Σουνιτική Συρία, και αν κάποια στιγμή ηρεμήσουν τα πράγματα οι Ρώσοι και ο Άσαντ θα καθαρίσουν τον ISIS για πλάκα. Έχετε υπόψη σας ότι το ΝΑΤΟ δεν μπορεί να μπαίνει στην Συρία όποτε γουστάρει, γιατί η Συρία είναι χωράφι της Ρωσίας από την εποχή των Σοβιετικών. Οι Ρώσοι αφήνουν τους Αμερικανούς να βομβαρδίζουν τον ISIS, αλλά ξέρουν ότι χωρίς στρατό στο έδαφος δεν κάνεις τίποτα. Επίσης οι Αμερικανοί έχουν σταματήσει να ενοχλούν τον Άσαντ.

Αν η Χίλαρι Κλίντον κάνει αυτό που λέει, να στείλει στρατό στην Συρία για να καθαρίσει τον ISIS, τότε μπορεί να γίνει πόλεμος, γιατί προφανώς η Ρωσία δεν θα επιτρέψει στους Αμερικανούς να καθαρίσουν τον ISIS. Αν οι Αμερικανοί καθαρίσουν τον ISIS και την Al-Qaeda στην Συρία θα μπορούν να δημιουργήσουν έναν φιλοδυτκό Σουνιτικό στρατό μαζί με τους Τούρκους και τους Καταριανούς.

Φυσικά ο Πούτιν δεν θα πει δεν θέλω να χτυπήσετε τον ISIS, αλλά θα πει δεν θέλω να μπαίνετε στην Συρία που είναι μία ενιαία χώρα, και δεν είναι Αλαουτική, Σουνιτική και Κουρδική, αλλά απλά Συρία, και είναι και υπό την προστασία της Ρωσίας.

Τώρα η al Nusra χτυπάει τον Άσαντ και τους Κούρδους στην Συρία, με την χρηματοδότηση του Κατάρ και την υποστήριξη του Ερντογάν, και ο ISIS χτυπάει την al-Nusra και τους Κούρδους στην Συρία, και τους Αμερικανούς και τους Κούρδους στο Ιράκ, φροντίζοντας να μένει μακριά από τον Άσαντ.

Να δούμε τώρα που υποτίθεται ότι τα βρήκανε ο Πούτιν με τον Ερντογάν τι θα γίνει. Ελπίζω να μην σπεύσουν οι κομμουνιστές να μας βγάλουν από το ΝΑΤΟ και την ΕΕ για να γλιτώσουν τις μεταρρυθμίσεις και τις αποκρατικοποιήσεις, και μας βάλουν στο άξονα Πούτιν-Ερντογάν κάνοντας ταυτόχρονα και δικτατορία.

Τα άρθρα που ακολουθούν τα έχων ανεβάσει ξανά.

Για το πως οργάνωσε ο Bakr τον ISIS βλέπε το άρθρο του Spiegel “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State”, Απρίλιος 2015.


Άρθρα

“Πως ο Πούτιν και ο Άσαντ Δημιούργησαν το Ισλαμικό Κράτος”

Spiegel: Πως ο Άσαντ και ο Πούτιν δημιούργησαν το Ισλαμικό Κράτος
“The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State”, Απρίλιος 2015
1 , 2, 3 Παράγραφος
Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was.
But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state. It is a folder full of handwritten organizational charts, lists and schedules, which describe how a country can be gradually subjugated. SPIEGEL has gained exclusive access to the 31 pages, some consisting of several pages pasted together. They reveal a multilayered composition and directives for action, some already tested and others newly devised for the anarchical situation in Syria's rebel-held territories. In a sense, the documents are the source code of the most successful terrorist army in recent history.
5 Παράγραφος
For the first time, the Haji Bakr documents now make it possible to reach conclusions on how the IS leadership is organized and what role former officials in the government of ex-dictator Saddam Hussein play in it. Above all, however, they show how the takeover in northern Syria was planned, making the group's later advances into Iraq possible in the first place. In addition, months of research undertaken by SPIEGEL in Syria, as well as other newly discovered records, exclusive to SPIEGEL, show that Haji Bakr's instructions were carried out meticulously.
8 Παράγραφς
The story of this collection of documents begins at a time when few had yet heard of the "Islamic State." When Iraqi national Haji Bakr traveled to Syria as part of a tiny advance party in late 2012, he had a seemingly absurd plan: IS would capture as much territory as possible in Syria. Then, using Syria as a beachhead, it would invade Iraq.
21η Παράγραφος
It seemed as if George Orwell had been the model for this spawn of paranoid surveillance. But it was much simpler than that. Bakr was merely modifying what he had learned in the past: Saddam Hussein's omnipresent security apparatus, in which no one, not even generals in the intelligence service, could be certain they weren't being spied on.
24 , 25 , 26 Παράγραφος
In 2010, Bakr and a small group of former Iraqi intelligence officers made Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir and later "caliph," the official leader of the Islamic State. They reasoned that Baghdadi, an educated cleric, would give the group a religious face.
Bakr was "a nationalist, not an Islamist," says Iraqi journalist Hisham al-Hashimi, as he recalls the former career officer, who was stationed with Hashimi's cousin at the Habbaniya Air Base. "Colonel Samir," as Hashimi calls him, "was highly intelligent, firm and an excellent logistician." But when Paul Bremer, then head of the US occupational authority in Baghdad, "dissolved the army by decree in May 2003, he was bitter and unemployed."
Thousands of well-trained Sunni officers were robbed of their livelihood with the stroke of a pen. In doing so, America created its most bitter and intelligent enemies. Bakr went underground and met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Anbar Province in western Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian by birth, had previously run a training camp for international terrorist pilgrims in Afghanistan. Starting in 2003, he gained global notoriety as the mastermind of attacks against the United Nations, US troops and Shiite Muslims. He was even too radical for former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi died in a US air strike in 2006.
28 , 29 , 30 Παράγραφος
Bakr gradually became one of the military leaders in Iraq, and he was held from 2006 to 2008 in the US military's Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib Prison. He survived the waves of arrests and killings by American and Iraqi special units, which threatened the very existence of the IS precursor organization in 2010, Islamic State in Iraq.
For Bakr and a number of former high-ranking officers, this presented an opportunity to seize power in a significantly smaller circle of jihadists. They utilized the time they shared in Camp Bucca to establish a large network of contacts. But the top leaders had already known each other for a long time. Haji Bakr and an additional officer were part of the tiny secret-service unit attached to the anti-aircraft division. Two other IS leaders were from a small community of Sunni Turkmen in the town of Tal Afar. One of them was a high-ranking intelligence officer as well.
In 2010, the idea of trying to defeat Iraqi government forces militarily seemed futile. But a powerful underground organization took shape through acts of terror and protection rackets. When the uprising against the dictatorship of the Assad clan erupted in neighboring Syria, the organization's leaders sensed an opportunity. By late 2012, particularly in the north, the formerly omnipotent government forces had largely been defeated and expelled. Instead, there were now hundreds of local councils and rebel brigades, part of an anarchic mix that no one could keep track of. It was a state of vulnerability that the tightly organized group of ex-officers sought to exploit.
42, 43 Παράγραφος
True to Haji Bakr's plan, the phase of infiltration was followed by the elimination of every person who might have been a potential leader or opponent. The first person hit was the head of the city council, who was kidnapped in mid-May 2013 by masked men. The next person to disappear was the brother of a prominent novelist. Two days later, the man who had led the group that painted a revolutionary flag on the city walls vanished.
"We had an idea who kidnapped him," one of his friends explains, "but no one dared any longer to do anything." The system of fear began to take hold. Starting in July, first dozens and then hundreds of people disappeared. Sometimes their bodies were found, but they usually disappeared without a trace. In August, the IS military leadership dispatched several cars driven by suicide bombers to the headquarters of the FSA brigade, the "Grandsons of the Prophet," killing dozens of fighters and leading the rest to flee. The other rebels merely looked on. IS leadership had spun a web of secret deals with the brigades so that each thought it was only the others who might be the targets of IS attacks.
47, 48 Παράγραφος
Until the end of 2013, everything was going according to Islamic State's plan -- or at least according to the plan of Haji Bakr. The caliphate was expanding village by village without being confronted by unified resistance from Syrian rebels. Indeed, the rebels seemed paralyzed in the face of IS' sinister power.
But when IS henchmen brutally tortured a well-liked rebel leader and doctor to death in December 2013, something unexpected happened. Across the country, Syrian brigades -- both secular and parts of the radical Nusra Front -- joined together to do battle with Islamic State. By attacking IS everywhere at the same time, they were able to rob the Islamists of their tactical advantage -- that of being able to rapidly move units to where they were most urgently needed.
52, 53, 54, 55, 56 Παράγραφος
Haji Bakr stayed behind in the small city of Tal Rifaat, where IS had long had the upper hand. But when rebels attacked at the end of January 2014, the city became divided within just a few hours. One half remained under IS control while the other was wrested away by one of the local brigades. Haji Bakr was stuck in the wrong half. Furthermore, in order to remain incognito he had refrained from moving into one of the heavily guarded IS military quarters. And so, the godfather of snitching was snitched on by a neighbor. "A Daish sheik lives next door!" the man called. A local commander named Abdelmalik Hadbe and his men drove over to Bakr's house. A woman jerked open the door and said brusquely: "My husband isn't here."
But his car is parked out front, the rebels countered.
At that moment, Haji Bakr appeared at the door in his pajamas. Hadbe ordered him to come with them, whereupon Bakr protested that he wanted to get dressed. No, Hadbe repeated: "Come with us! Immediately!"
Surprisingly nimbly for his age, Bakr jumped back and kicked the door closed, according to two people who witnessed the scene. He then hid under the stairs and yelled: "I have a suicide belt! I'll blow up all of us!" He then came out with a Kalashnikov and began shooting. Hadbe then fired his weapon and killed Bakr.
When the men later learned who they had killed, they searched the house, gathering up computers, passports, mobile phone SIM cards, a GPS device and, most importantly, papers. They didn't find a Koran anywhere.
58 Παράγραφος
Haji Bakr's state continued to work even without its creator. Just how precisely his plans were implemented -- point by point -- is confirmed by the discovery of another file. When IS was forced to rapidly abandon its headquarters in Aleppo in January 2014, they tried to burn their archive, but they ran into a problem similar to that confronted by the East German secret police 25 years earlier: They had too many files.
63, 64 , 65 , 66, 67, 68, 69 Παράγραφος
But in the first months of 2014, yet another legacy from Haji Bakr began playing a decisive role: His decade of contacts to Assad's intelligence services.
In 2003, the Damascus regime was panicked that then-US President George W. Bush, after his victory over Saddam Hussein, would have his troops continue into Syria to topple Assad as well. Thus, in the ensuing years, Syrian intelligence officials organized the transfer of thousands of radicals from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to al-Qaida in Iraq. Ninety percent of the suicide attackers entered Iraq via the Syrian route. A strange relationship developed between Syrian generals, international jihadists and former Iraqi officers who had been loyal to Saddam -- a joint venture of deadly enemies, who met repeatedly to the west of Damascus.
At the time, the primary aim was to make the lives of the Americans in Iraq hell. Ten years later, Bashar Assad had a different motive to breathe new life into the alliance: He wanted to sell himself to the world as the lesser of several evils. Islamist terror, the more gruesome the better, was too important to leave it up to the terrorists. The regime's relationship with Islamic State is -- just as it was to its predecessor a decade prior -- marked by a completely tactical pragmatism. Both sides are trying to use the other in the assumption that it will emerge as the stronger power, able to defeat the discrete collaborator of yesterday. Conversely, IS leaders had no problem receiving assistance from Assad's air force, despite all of the group's pledges to annihilate the apostate Shiites. Starting in January 2014, Syrian jets would regularly -- and exclusively -- bomb rebel positions and headquarters during battles between IS and rebel groups.
In battles between IS and rebels in January 2014, Assad's jets regularly bombed only rebel positions, while the Islamic State emir ordered his fighters to refrain from shooting at the army. It was an arrangement that left many of the foreign fighters deeply disillusioned; they had imaged jihad differently.
IS threw its entire arsenal at the rebels, sending more suicide bombers into their ranks in just a few weeks than it deployed during the entire previous year against the Syrian army. Thanks in part to additional air strikes, IS was able to reconquer territory that it had briefly lost.
Nothing symbolizes the tactical shifting of alliances more than the fate of the Syrian army's Division 17. The isolated base near Raqqa had been under rebel siege for more than a year. But then, IS units defeated the rebels there and Assad's air force was once again able to use the base for supply flights without fear of attack.
But a half year later, after IS conquered Mosul and took control of a gigantic weapons depot there, the jihadists felt powerful enough to attack their erstwhile helpers. IS fighters overran Division 17 and slaughtered the soldiers, whom they had only recently protected.
72, 73, 74 Παράγραφος
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may be the officially named leader, but it remains unclear how much power he holds. In any case, when an emissary of al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahiri contacted the Islamic State, it was Haji Bakr and other intelligence officers, and not al-Baghdadi, whom he approached. Afterwards, the emissary bemoaned "these phony snakes who are betraying the real jihad."
Within IS, there are state structures, bureaucracy and authorities. But there is also a parallel command structure: elite units next to normal troops; additional commanders alongside nominal military head Omar al-Shishani; power brokers who transfer or demote provincial and town emirs or even make them disappear at will. Furthermore, decisions are not, as a rule, made in Shura Councils, nominally the highest decision-making body. Instead, they are being made by the "people who loosen and bind" (ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd), a clandestine circle whose name is taken from the Islam of medieval times.
Islamic State is able to recognize all manner of internal revolts and stifle them. At the same time, the hermitic surveillance structure is also useful for the financial exploitation of its subjects.

Η Ζωή του Αρχηγού της Al-Qaeda του Ιράκ, του Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
“The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”, Αύγουστος 2006
1η , 2η, 3η, 4η Παράγραφος
On a cold and blustery evening in December 1989, Huthaifa Azzam, the teenage son of the legendary Jordanian-Palestinian mujahideen leader Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, went to the airport in Peshawar,Pakistan, to welcome a group of young men. All were new recruits, largely from Jordan, and they had come to fight in a fratricidal civil war in neighboring Afghanistan—an outgrowth of the CIA-financed jihad of the 1980s against the Soviet occupation there.
The men were scruffy, Huthaifa mused as he greeted them, and seemed hardly in battle-ready form. Some had just been released from prison; others were professors and sheikhs. None of them would prove worth remembering—except for a relatively short, squat man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah.
He would later rename himself Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Once one of the most wanted men in the world, for whose arrest the United States offered a $25 million reward, al-Zarqawi was a notoriously enigmatic figure—a man who was everywhere yet nowhere. I went to Jordan earlier this year, three months before he was killed by a U.S. airstrike in early June, to find out who he really was, and to try to understand the role he was playing in the anti-American insurgency in Iraq. I also hoped to get a sense of how his generation—the foreign fighters now waging jihad in Iraq—compare with the foreign fighters who twenty years ago waged jihad in Afghanistan.
9η Παράγραφος
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, barely forty and barely literate, a Bedouin from the Bani Hassan tribe, was until recently almost unknown outside his native Jordan. Then, on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell catapulted him onto the world stage. In his address to the United Nations making the case for war in Iraq, Powell identified al-Zarqawi—mistakenly, as it turned out—as the crucial link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime. Subsequently, al-Zarqawi became a leading figure in the insurgency in Iraq—and in November of last year, he also brought his jihadist revolution back home, as the architect of three lethal hotel bombings in Amman. His notoriety grew with every atrocity he perpetrated, yet Western and Middle Eastern intelligence officials remained bedeviled by a simple question: Who was he? Was he al-Qaeda’s point man in Iraq, as the Bush administration argued repeatedly? Or was he, as a retired Israeli intelligence official told me not long ago, a staunch rival of bin Laden’s, whose importance the United States exaggerated in order to validate a link between al-Qaeda and pre-war Iraq, and to put a non-Iraqi face on a complex insurgency?
16η Παράγραφος
Everyone I spoke with readily acknowledged that as a teenager al-Zarqawi had been a bully and a thug, a bootlegger and a heavy drinker, and even, allegedly, a pimp in Zarqa’s underworld. He was disruptive, constantly involved in brawls. When he was fifteen (according to his police record, about which I had been briefed in Amman), he participated in a robbery of a relative’s home, during which the relative was killed. Two years later, a year shy of graduation, he had dropped out of school. Then, in 1989, at the age of twenty-three, he traveled to Afghanistan.
22η , 23η , 24η Παράγραφος
"He was an ordinary guy, an ordinary fighter, and didn’t really distinguish himself,” Huthaifa Azzam said of al-Zarqawi’s first time in Afghanistan. “He was a quiet guy who didn’t talk much. But he was brave. Zarqawi doesn’t know the meaning of fear. He’s been wounded five or six times in Afghanistan and Iraq. He seems to intentionally place himself in the middle of the most dangerous situations. He fought in the battles of Khost and Kardez and, in April 1992, witnessed the liberation of Kabul by the mujahideen. A lot of Arabs were great commanders during those years. Zarqawi was not. He also wasn’t very religious during that time. In fact, he’d only ‘returned’ to Islam three months before coming to Afghanistan. It was the Tablighi Jamaat [a proselytizing missionary group spread across the Muslim world] who convinced him—he had thirty-seven criminal cases against him by then—that it was time to cleanse himself.”
A Jordanian counterterrorism official expanded on al-Zarqawi’s time in Afghanistan for me. “His second time in Afghanistan was far more important than the first. But the first was significant in two ways. Zarqawi was young and impressionable; he’d never been out of Jordan before, and now, for the first time, he was interacting with doctrinaire Islamists from across the Muslim world, most of them brought to Afghanistan by the CIA. It was also his first exposure to al-Qaeda. He didn’t meet bin Laden, of course, but he trained in one of his and Abdullah Azzam’s camps: the Sada camp near the Afghan border inside Pakistan. He trained under Abu Hafs al-Masri.” (The reference was to the nom de guerre of Mohammed Atef, an Egyptian who was bin Laden’s military chief and, until he was killed in an American air strike in Afghanistan in November 2001, the No. 3 official in al-Qaeda.)
Abu Muntassir Bilah Muhammad is another jihadist who spent time fighting in Afghanistan and who would later become one of the co-founders of al-Zarqawi’s first militant Islamist group. “Zarqawi arrived in Afghanistan as a zero,” he told me, “a man with no career, just floundering about. He trained and fought and he came back to Jordan with ambitions and dreams: to carry the ideology of jihad. His first ambition was to reform Jordan, to set up an Islamist state. And there was a cachet involved in fighting in the jihad. Zarqawi returned to Jordan with newfound respect. It’s not so much what Zarqawi did in the jihad—it’s what the jihad did for him.”
26η Παράγραφος
But perhaps as important as anything else, it was in Afghanistan that al-Zarqawi was introduced to Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whose real name is Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi), a revered and militant Salafist cleric who had moved to Zarqa following the mass expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The Salafiya movement originated in Egypt, at the end of the nineteenth century, as a modernist Sunni reform movement, the aim of which was to let the Muslim world rise to the challenges posed by Western science and political thought. But since the 1920s, it has evolved into a severely puritanical school of absolutist thought that is markedly anti-Western and based on a literal interpretation of the Koran. Today’s most radical Salafists regard any departure from their own rigid principles of Islam to be heretical; their particular hatred of Shiites—who broke with the Sunnis in 632 A.D. over the question of succession to the Prophet Muhammad, and who now constitute the majority in Iran and Iraq—is visceral. Over the years, al-Maqdisi embraced the most extreme school of Salafism, closely akin to the puritanical Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, and in the early 1980s he published The Creed of Abraham, the single most important source of teachings for Salafist movements around the world. Al-Maqdisi would become al-Zarqawi’s ideological mentor and most profound influence.
28η, 29η  Παράγραφος
Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi left Afghanistan in 1993 and returned to Jordan. They found it much changed. In their absence the Jordanians and the Israelis had begun negotiations that would lead to the signing of a peace treaty in 1994; the Palestinians had signed the Oslo Accords of 1993; and the Iraqis had lost the Gulf War. Unemployment was up sharply, the result of a privatization drive agreed to with the International Monetary Fund, and Jordanians were frustrated and angry. The Muslim Brotherhood—the kingdom’s only viable opposition political force, which had agreed to support King Hussein in exchange for being allowed to participate in public and parliamentary life—appeared unable to cope with the rising disaffection. Small underground Islamist groups had therefore begun to appear, composed largely of men who had fought in the Afghan jihad, and who were guided by the increasingly loud voices of militant clerics who felt the Muslim Brotherhood had been co-opted by the state.
After the two men returned home, al-Maqdisi toured the kingdom, preaching and recruiting, and al-Zarqawi sought out Abu Muntassir, who had already acquired a standing among Islamic militants in Jordan. “We talked a lot, over a couple of days,” Abu Muntassir told me. “He was still pretty much a novice, but very willing, very able, and keen to learn about Islam. I was teaching geography at the time in a government school, so it was easy for me to teach Islam as well. After some time, Zarqawi asked me to work with him in an Islamic group; al-Maqdisi was already on board. The idea was there, but it had no leadership and no name. First we called it al-Tawhid, then changed the name to Bayat al-Imam [Allegiance to the Imam]. We were small but enthusiastic—a dozen or so men. Our primary objective, of course, was to overthrow the monarchy and establish an Islamic government.”
31η, 32η , 33η Παράγραφος
In another botched operation, al-Maqdisi (according to court testimony that he denied) gave al-Zarqawi seven grenades he had smuggled into Jordan, and al-Zarqawi hid them in the cellar of his family’s home. Al-Maqdisi was already under surveillance by Jordan’s intelligence service by that time, because of his growing popularity. The grenades were quickly discovered, and the two men, along with a number of their followers, found themselves for the first time before a state security court. Al-Zarqawi told the court that he had found the grenades while walking down the street. The judges were not amused. They convicted him and al-Maqdisi of possessing illegal weapons and belonging to a banned organization. In 1994, al-Zarqawi was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. He would flourish there.
Swaqa prison sits on the southern desert’s edge, sixty miles south of Amman, and its political prisoners, both Islamist and secular, are housed in four wings. Al-Zarqawi embraced prison life in the extreme—as he appears to have embraced everything. According to fellow inmates of his with whom I spoke, his primary obsessions were recruiting other prisoners to his cause, building his body, and, under the tutelage of al-Maqdisi, memorizing the 6,236 verses of the Koran. He was stern, tough, and unrelenting on anything that he considered to be an infraction of his rules, yet he was often seen in the prison courtyard crying as he read the Koran.
He was fastidious about his appearance in prison—his beard and moustache were always cosmetically groomed—and he wore only Afghan dress: the shalwar kameez and a rolled-brim, woolen Pashtun cap. One former inmate who served time with him told me that al-Zarqawi sauntered through the prison ward like a “peacock.” Islamists flocked to him. He attracted recruits; some joined him out of fascination, others out of curiosity, and still others out of fear. In a short time, he had organized prison life at Swaqa like a gang leader.
36η Παράγραφος
When Abu Rumman entered Swaqa, al-Zarqawi was in isolation following a prison brawl. “It was quite extraordinary,” Abu Rumman said. “My first glimpse of Zarqawi was when he was released. He returned to the ward as a hero surrounded by his own bodyguards. Everyone began to shout: Allahu Akhbar! By that time Zarqawi was already called the ‘emir,’ or ‘prince.’ He had an uncanny ability to control, almost to hypnotize; he could order his followers to do things just by moving his eyes.”
41η , 42η , 43η  Παράγραφος
In 1998, three or four of al-Zarqawi’s tracts were posted on the Internet, after heavy editing. Soon they came to the attention of Osama bin Laden, in Afghanistan. It was the first time he had ever heard of al-Zarqawi.
In May of the following year, Jordan’s King Abdullah II—newly enthroned after the death of his father, King Hussein—declared a general amnesty, and al-Zarqawi was released from Swaqa. He had made effective use of his time there. As he had done nearly a decade before—when he befriended wealthy Saudi jihadists in Khost—he had expanded his reach and his appeal during his prison years. Among the fellow inmates he had converted to Salafism and brought into the Bayat al-Imam were a substantial number of prisoners from Iraq.
After returning for a few months to Zarqa, al-Zarqawi left again and traveled to Pakistan. He may or may not have known that Jordan was about to declare him a suspect in a series of foiled terrorist attacks intended for New Year’s Eve of 1999. The plan, which became known as the “Millennium Plot,” involved the bombing of Christian landmarks and other tourist sites, along with the Radisson Hotel in Amman. Had it succeeded, it would have been al-Zarqawi’s first involvement in a major terrorist attack.
45η, 46η  , 48η , 49η , 50η , 51η Παράγραφος
In December 1999, al-Zarqawi crossed the border into Afghanistan, and later that month he and bin Laden met at the Government Guest House in the southern city of Kandahar, the de facto capital of the ruling Taliban. As they sat facing each other across the receiving room, a former Israeli intelligence official told me, “it was loathing at first sight.”
According to several different accounts of the meeting, bin Laden distrusted and disliked al-Zarqawi immediately. He suspected that the group of Jordanian prisoners with whom al-Zarqawi had been granted amnesty earlier in the year had been infiltrated by Jordanian intelligence; something similar had occurred not long before with a Jordanian jihadist cell that had come to Afghanistan. Bin Laden also disliked al-Zarqawi’s swagger and the green tattoos on his left hand, which he reportedly considered un-Islamic. Al-Zarqawi came across to bin Laden as aggressively ambitious, abrasive, and overbearing. His hatred of Shiites also seemed to bin Laden to be potentially divisive—which, of course, it was. (Bin Laden’s mother, to whom he remains close, is a Shiite, from the Alawites of Syria.)
Al-Zarqawi would not recant, even in the presence of the legendary head of al-Qaeda. “Shiites should be executed,” he reportedly declared. He also took exception to bin Laden’s providing Arab fighters to the Taliban, the fundamentalist student militia that, although now in power, was still battling the Northern Alliance, which controlled some 10 percent of Afghanistan. Muslim killing Muslim was un-Islamic, al-Zarqawi is reported to have said.
Unaccustomed to such direct criticism, the leader of al-Qaeda was aghast.
Had Saif al-Adel—now bin Laden’s military chief—not intervened, history might be written very differently.
A former Egyptian army colonel who had trained in special operations, al-Adel was then al-Qaeda’s chief of security and a prominent voice in an emerging debate gripping the militant Islamist world. Who should the primary target be—the “near enemy” (the Muslim world’s “un-Islamic” regimes) or the “far enemy” (primarily Israel and the United States)? Al-Zarqawi was a near-enemy advocate, and although his obsession remained the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy, he had expanded his horizons slightly during his prison years and had now begun to focus on the area known as al-Sham, or the Levant, which includes Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and historic Palestine. As an Egyptian who had attempted to overthrow his own country’s army-backed regime, al-Adel saw merit in al-Zarqawi’s views. Thus, after a good deal of debate within al-Qaeda, it was agreed that al-Zarqawi would be given $5,000 or so in “seed money” to set up his own training camp outside the western Afghan city of Herat, near the Iranian border. It was about as far away as he could be from bin Laden.
Saif al-Adel was designated the middleman.
In early 2000, with a dozen or so followers who had arrived from Peshawar and Amman, al-Zarqawi set out for the western desert encircling Herat. His goal: to build an army that he could export to anywhere in the world. Al-Adel paid monthly visits to al-Zarqawi’s training camp; later, on his Web site, he would write that he was amazed at what he saw there. The number of al-Zarqawi’s fighters multiplied from dozens to hundreds during the following year, and by the time the forces evacuated their camp, prior to the U.S. air strikes of October 200l, the fighters and their families numbered some 2,000 to 3,000. According to al-Adel, the wives of al-Zarqawi’s followers served lavish Levantine cuisine in the camp.
It was in Herat that al-Zarqawi formed the militant organization Jund al-Sham, or Soldiers of the Levant. His key operational lieutenants were mainly Syrians—most of whom had fought in the Afghan jihad, and many of whom belonged to their country’s banned Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s exiled leadership, which is largely based in Europe, was immensely important in recruiting for the Herat camp, although whether it also supplied funds remains under debate. What is clear, however, is that al-Zarqawi’s closest aide, a Syrian from the city of Hama named Sulayman Khalid Darwish—or Abu al-Ghadiyah—was considered to be, until his death last summer on the Iraqi-Syrian frontier, one of al-Zarqawi’s most likely successors.
53η, 54η ,55η , 56η, 57η , 58η , 59η Παράγραφος
At least five times, in 2000 and 2001, bin Laden called al-Zarqawi to come to Kandahar and pay bayat—take an oath of allegiance—to him. Each time, al-Zarqawi refused. Under no circumstances did he want to become involved in the battle between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. He also did not believe that either bin Laden or the Taliban was serious enough about jihad.
When the United States launched its air war inside Afghanistan, on October 7, 2001, al-Zarqawi joined forces with al-Qaeda and the Taliban for the first time. He and his Jund al-Sham fought in and around Herat and Kandahar. Al-Zarqawi was wounded in an American air strike—not in the leg, as U.S. officials claimed for two years, but in the chest, when the ceiling of the building in which he was operating collapsed on him. Neither did he join Osama bin Laden in the eastern mountains of Tora Bora, as U.S. officials have also said. Bin Laden took only his most trusted fighters to Tora Bora, and al-Zarqawi was not one of them.
In December 2001, accompanied by some 300 fighters from Jund al-Sham, al-Zarqawi left Afghanistan once again, and entered Iran.
During the next fourteen months, al-Zarqawi based himself primarily in Iran and in the autonomous area of Kurdistan, in northern Iraq, traveling from time to time to Syria and to the Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp in the south of Lebanon—a camp that, according to the former Jordanian intelligence official, became his main recruiting ground. More often, however, al-Zarqawi traveled to the Sunni Triangle of Iraq. He expanded his network, recruited and trained new fighters, and set up bases, safe houses, and military training camps. In Iran, he was reunited with Saif al-Adel—who encouraged him to go to Iraq and provided contacts there—and for a time, al-Zarqawi stayed at a farm belonging to the fiercely anti-American Afghan jihad leader Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. In Kurdistan he lived and worked with the separatist militant Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, ironically in an area protected as part of the “no-fly” zone imposed on Saddam Hussein by Washington.
One can only imagine how astonished al-Zarqawi must have been when Colin Powell named him as the crucial link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime. He was not even officially a part of al-Qaeda, and ever since he had left Afghanistan, his links had been not to Iraq but to Iran.
“We know Zarqawi better than he knows himself,” the high-level Jordanian intelligence official said. “And I can assure you that he never had any links to Saddam. Iran is quite a different matter. The Iranians have a policy: they want to control Iraq. And part of this policy has been to support Zarqawi, tactically but not strategically.”
“In the beginning they gave him automatic weapons, uniforms, military equipment, when he was with the army of Ansar al-Islam. Now they essentially just turn a blind eye to his activities, and to those of al-Qaeda generally. The Iranians see Iraq as a fight against the Americans, and overall, they’ll get rid of Zarqawi and all of his people once the Americans are out.”
In the summer of 2003, three months after the American invasion, al-Zarqawi moved to the Sunni areas of Iraq. He became infamous almost at once. On August 7, he allegedly carried out a car-bomb attack at the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad. Twelve days later, he was linked to the bombing of the United Nations headquarters, in which twenty-two people died. And on August 29, in what was then the deadliest attack of the war, he engineered the killing of over a hundred people, including a revered cleric, the Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, in a car bombing outside Shia Islam’s holy shrine in Najaf. The suicide bomber in that attack was Yassin Jarad, from Zarqa. He was al-Zarqawi’s father-in-law.
63η Παράγραφος
Of course, no one did more to cultivate that image than al-Zarqawi himself. He committed some of the deadliest attacks in Iraq, though they still represent only some 10 percent of the country’s total number of attacks. In May 2004, he inaugurated his notorious wave of hostage beheadings; he also specialized in suicide and truck bombings of Shiite shrines and mosques, largely in Shiite neighborhoods. His primary aim was to provoke a civil war. “If we succeed in dragging [the Shia] into a sectarian war,” he purportedly wrote in a letter intercepted by U.S. forces and released in February 2004, “this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death at the hands of the Shia.” (The authenticity of the letter came into question almost immediately.)
65η, 66η , 67η , 68η 69η Παράγραφος
Regardless of his growing notoriety in Iraq, al-Zarqawi never lost sight of his ultimate goal: the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy. His efforts to foment unrest in Jordan included the 2002 assassination of the U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley, and, on a far larger scale, a disrupted plot in 2004 to bomb the headquarters of the Jordanian intelligence services—a scheme that, according to Jordanian officials, would have entailed the use of trucks packed with enough chemicals and explosives to kill some 80,000 people. Once it was uncovered, al-Zarqawi immediately accepted responsibility for the plot, although he denied that chemical weapons would have been involved.
Later that year, in October 2004, after resisting for nearly five years, al-Zarqawi finally paid bayat to Osama bin Laden—but only after eight months of often stormy negotiations. After doing so he proclaimed himself to be the “Emir of al-Qaeda’s Operations in the Land of Mesopotamia,” a title that subordinated him to bin Laden but at the same time placed him firmly on the global stage. One explanation for this coming together of these two former antagonists was simple: al-Zarqawi profited from the al-Qaeda franchise, and bin Laden needed a presence in Iraq. Another explanation is more complex: bin Laden laid claim to al-Zarqawi in the hopes of forestalling his emergence as the single most important terrorist figure in the world, and al-Zarqawi accepted bin Laden’s endorsement to augment his credibility and to strengthen his grip on the Iraqi tribes. Both explanations are true.
“From the beginning, Zarqawi has wanted to be independent, and he will continue to be,” Oraib Rantawi, the director of the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman, said to me. “Yes, he’s gained stature through this alliance, but he only swore bayat after all this time because of growing pressure from Iraqis who were members of al-Qaeda. And even then he signed with conditions—that he would maintain control over Jund al-Sham and al-Tawhid, and that he would exert operational autonomy. His suicide bombings of the hotels in Amman”—in which some sixty civilians died, many of them while attending a wedding celebration—“was a huge tactical mistake. My understanding is that bin Laden was furious about it.”
The attacks, which represented an expansion of al- Zarqawi’s sophistication and reach, also showed his growing independence from the al-Qaeda chief. They came only thirteen months after he had sworn bayat. The alliance had already begun to fray.
The signs were visible as early as the summer of 2005. In a letter purportedly sent to al-Zarqawi in July from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian surgeon who is bin Laden’s designated heir, al-Zarqawi was chided about his tactics in Iraq. And although some experts have cast doubt on the letter’s authenticity (it was released by the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence), few would dispute its message: namely, that al-Zarqawi’s hostage beheadings, his mass slaughter of Shiites, and his assaults on their mosques were all having a negative effect on Muslim opinion—both of him and, by extension, of al-Qaeda—around the world. In one admonition, al-Zawahiri allegedly advised al-Zarqawi that a captive can be killed as easily by a bullet as by a knife.
76η Παράγραφος
“Not at all,” he replied. “Zarqawi had the ambition to become what he has, but whatever happens, even if he becomes the most popular figure in Iraq, he can never go against the symbolism that bin Laden represents. If Zarqawi is captured or killed tomorrow, the Iraqi insurgency will go on. There is no such thing as ‘Zarqawism.’ What Zarqawi is will die with him. Bin Laden, on the other hand, is an ideological thinker. He created the concept of al-Qaeda and all of its offshoots. He feels he’s achieved his goal.” He paused for a moment, then said, “Osama bin Laden is like Karl Marx. Both created an ideology. Marxism still flourished well after Marx’s death. And whether bin Laden is killed, or simply dies of natural causes, al-Qaedaism will survive him.”

Το Κατάρ προσπαθεί να πείσει την al-Nusra να διακόψει τελείως την συνεργασία της με τα κεντρικά της Al-Qaeda και να συνεργαστεί με τους Άραβες του Περσικού Κόλπου, ώστε μαζί να χτυπήσουν τον Άσαντ και το Ισλαμικό Κράτος.
Syria's Nusra Front may leave Qaeda to form new entity”, Μάρτιος 2015
Leaders of Syria's Nusra Front are considering cutting their links with al Qaeda to form a new entity backed by some Gulf states trying to topple President Bashar al-Assad, sources said.
Sources within and close to Nusra said that Qatar, which enjoys good relations with the group, is encouraging the group to go ahead with the move, which would give Nusra a boost in funding.
The exercise could transform Nusra from a weakened militia group into a force capable of taking on Islamic State at a time when it is under pressure from bombing raids and advances by Kurdish and Iraqi military forces.
It could also boost the influence of Qatar and its allies in the campaign to oust Assad, in line with the Gulf state's growing diplomatic ambitions in the region. Qatari officials were not available for comment.
While it awaits the final word from its decision-making Shoura council, Nusra is not wasting time. It has turned on small non-jihadi groups, seizing their territory and forcing them to disarm so as to consolidate Nusra's power in northern Syria and pave the way for the new group.
Intelligence officials from Gulf states including Qatar have met the leader of Nusra, Abu Mohamad al-Golani, several times in the past few months to encourage him to abandon al Qaeda and to discuss what support they could provide, the sources said.
They promised funding once it happens.
"A new entity will see the light soon, which will include Nusra and Jaysh al Muhajereen wel Ansar and other small brigades," said Muzamjer al-Sham, a prominent jihadi figure who is close to Nusra and other Islamist groups in Syria.
"The name of Nusra will be abandoned. It will disengage from al Qaeda. But not all the Nusra emirs agree and that is why the announcement has been delayed," said Sham.
A source close to the foreign ministry confirmed that Qatar wanted Nusra to become a purely Syrian force not linked to al Qaeda.
"They are promising Nusra more support, i.e. money, supplies etc, once they let go of the Qaeda ties," the official said.
The Qatari-led bid to rebrand Nusra and to provide it with new support could further complicate the war in Syria as the United States prepares to arm and train non-jihadist rebels to fight Islamic State.
The Nusra Front is listed as a terrorist group by the United States and has been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. But for Qatar at least, rebranding Nusra would remove legal obstacles to supporting it.
FIGHTING ISLAMIC STATE
One of the goals of the new entity would be to fight Islamic State, Nusra's main competitor in Syria. IS is led by Iraqi jihadi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who helped create Nusra before falling out with Golani.
Once the most powerful group fighting Assad, Nusra was weakened when most of its commanders and fighters left with Baghdadi to form Islamic State. IS then killed many of Nusra's remaining leaders, confiscated its weapons, forced its commanders to go underground and seized its territory.
But recently Islamic State has come under pressure from air strikes by a U.S.-led coalition. It has also lost ground to Kurdish fighters in Syria and to the Iraqi armed forces. But the group is far from collapse.
But if Nusra splits from al Qaeda, some hope that with proper funding, arming and training, fighters from the new group will be able to tackle Islamic State.
Jihadi sources said that Golani suggested to the group's Shoura Council that it should merge with Jaysh al-Muhajereen wel Ansar, a smaller jihadi group composed of local and foreign fighters and led by a Chechen commander.
The announcement has been delayed due to objections from some of Nusra's leaders who reject the idea of leaving al Qaeda. But this was seen as unlikely to stop Golani.
"He is going to do it, he does not have a choice. Those who are not happy can leave," said a Nusra source who backs the move.
It seems Golani is already establishing the ground.
Nusra wants to use northern Syria as base for the new group. It launched offensives against Western-backed groups who have been vetted by the U.S. to receive military support.
In the northern province of Idlib it seized territory from the Syria Revolutionaries' Front led by Jamal Maarouf, forcing him to flee. Last week it went after another mainstream group, Harakat Hazzm in Aleppo province, forcing it to dissolve itself.
The U.S. State Department said the end of Harakat Hazzm would have an impact on the moderate opposition's capabilities in the north.
But if Nusra is dissolved and it abandons al Qaeda, the ideology of the new entity is not expected to change. Golani fought with al Qaeda in Iraq. Some other leaders fought inAfghanistan and are close al Qaeda chief Ayman Zawahri.
"Nusra had to pledge loyalty to Sheikh Zawahri to avoid being forced to be loyal to Baghdadi but that was not a good idea, it is time that this is abandoned," said a Nusra source in Aleppo. "It did not help Nusra and now it is on the terrorist list," he said.
(Reporting by Mariam Karouny; additional reporting by Amena Bakr in Doha; Editing by Giles Elgood)

“David Petraeus' bright idea: give terrorists weapons to beat terrorists”,Σεπτέμβριος 2015

Οι Αμερικανοί και κυβέρνηση της Βαγδάτης στο Ιράκ δεν ήθελαν να πάρει μέρος η Τουρκία στην απελευθέρωση της Μοσούλης από τον ISIS γιατί φοβόντουσαν ότι μετά την επιχείρηση τη Τουρκία δεν θα ήθελε να αποσύρει τους στρατιώτες της.
“Why Turkish military isn't welcome in Syria, Iraq”, Ιούνιος 2016
9η, 10η, 11η, 12η Παράγραφος
"Turkey's singularly pro-Sunni policies and support for the Muslim Brotherhood has long since been noted by the US which — like Baghdad — does not want any active Turkish participation in the push to liberate Mosul because of concerns that Turkish soldiers will refuse to leave the area when asked to do so," Baburoglu said.
Baghdad is still calling for Turkish troops deployed in the Bashiqa camp near Mosul against Iraq's wishes to be withdrawn. Washington has also called for these troops to be withdrawn but Turkey has refused to do so, thus fueling suspicions about Turkish intentions in Iraq
A Western diplomatic source who wished to remain anonymous due to his sensitive position told Al-Monitor that mistrust of Ankara's aims has turned Turkey in the eyes of many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies into a complicating rather than supporting factor in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria.
Ankara remains locked on Bashar al-Assad's ouster, on preventing Kurds from gaining territory or political clout in northern Syria and on bolstering the position of minority Sunnis in Iraq even as it is losing on all three fronts.



Τι χρωστάει το Ιράν στον ISIS και τι Χρωστάει ο ISIS στο Ιράν
What ISIS Owes Iran, and Vice-Versa
Perhaps the world's most infamous terrorist movement—the Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS), owes something to the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism—the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, most major media outlets have failed to note the complex history between theocratic, Shi'ite-ruled Iran and the Sunni group describing itself as the Islamic State. Instead, coverage has often fixated on sectarian differences and the simple narrative that Shi'ite Iran is fighting Sunni ISIS. This omits the important role that Iranian mullahs and their policies have played in providing support—originally direct but now indirect in the wake of open conflict—to the Islamic State.
Currently ISIS is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but the group's origins can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born terrorist who founded Tawhid wal-Jihad (“Monotheism and Jihad”). The Tawhid wal-Jihad terror cell eventually expanded into the Islamic State's progenitor—al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
After fleeing Afghanistan following the arrival of U.S.-led coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, Zarqawi was “based in Iran and northern Iraq” for “about a year.” After a brief arrest by Iranian authorities, he was allowed to “move freely” throughout the region to recruit, according to Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan in their book ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. The authors assert that according to Jordanian intelligence services, “it wasn't Baghdad America should have been looking at [for links to Zarqawi's group]…it was Tehran.” (pg. 17)
“The Iranians have a policy: they want to control Iraq. And part of this policy has been to support Zarqawi, tactically but not strategically….In the beginning they gave him weapons, uniforms, military equipment, when he was with the army of Ansar al-Islam [a Sunni terror group based in northern Iraq]. Now they essentially just turn a blind eye to his activities, and to those of al-Qaeda generally.”
Somewhat prophetically, a Jordanian official stated, “The Iranians see Iraq as a fight against the Americans, and overall, they'll get rid of Zarqawi and all of his people once the Americans are out.” (pg.18) (“The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” July 2006, The Atlantic)

Shi'ite Iran supporting Sunni terrorists

Support from Shi'ite Iran for non-Shi'ite terror groups is hardly unprecedented: Tehran has a history of strategically supporting Sunni terrorists that share the Islamic Republic's objectives of attacking Israel (such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or those who attack the “far enemy” of the United States, such as al-Qaeda. Followers of Osama bin Laden sought and received sanctuary in Iran after fleeing Afghanistan following the U.S.-invasion in response to al-Qaeda's Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks.
After receiving Iranian support, al-Zarqawi eventually would turn to sectarian warfare in Iraq, targeting Shi'ite holy places and murdering members of that Islamic sect. Long-dominated by Sunni members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party, post-U.S. invasion Iraq saw the rise of Shiite officials. While this better reflected the country's demography, it also provided both an opportunity for Tehran to project its influence and concurrently for al-Zarqawi to exploit Sunni fears of being shut out. As Weiss and Hassan observe, the election of Shiite Iraqi officials—some of whom had lived in Iran prior to the U.S. occupation—allowed al-Zarqawi to exploit an “incipient but real problem in Iraq's political evolution…the creeping takeover by chauvinistic Shia politicians, many of whom were spies or agents of influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).” (pg. 29)
Following al-Zarqawi's death in a 2006 U.S.-drone strike, the subsequent U.S.-led surge of forces and the so-called “Anbar-Awakening”—in which Iraqi Sunni tribes rejected the brutality of AQI in favor of U.S.-provided security, Sunni extremist terror groups briefly receded in key provinces. Yet, with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq—comprised of many former AQI terrorists—“ISIS has couched its current campaign in Syria and Iraq in exactly” the same sectarian terms as al-Zarqawi used. Meanwhile, the movement hopes to spur Sunni recruitment by targeting Shi'ites and prompting a fierce counterreaction.
Atrocities committed in Syria's civil war by Tehran-backed Shi'ite militias and U.S.-listed terror organizations like the Quds (Jerusalem) Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Kata'ib Hezbollah among others provided considerable help to ISIS in recruiting disenfranchised Sunnis.
In May 2011, Quds Force head Qassem Suleimani was sanctioned by the United States for “complicity…in the human rights abuses and repression of the Syrian people.” As Weiss and Hassan note, Suleimani used the head of Tehran's Badr Corps and Iraqi Transportation Minister, Hadi al-Amiri, to funnel weapons to Syria's General Intelligence Directorate—munitions often used in documented human rights abuses, including the targeting of civilian populations. The extensive level of Iranian involvement in Syria has also been noted by former Syrian Prime Minister Riyad Hijab who—after defecting in August 2012—declared: “Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime. The person who runs the country is not Bashar al-Assad [Syria's President] but Qassem Soleimani.” (pg. 139)
National Defense Forces in Syria—groups trained and often led by IRGC commanders—have been accused by Human Rights Watch of singling out Sunnis for attacks in Syrian towns of al-Bayda and Baniyas. As the Wall Street Journal has noted (“Syria's Alawite Force Turned Tide for Assad,” Aug. 26 2013), National Defense Force trainees are “told that the war in Syria is akin to epic battle for Shiite Islam, and if they die they will be martyrs of the highest rank.”

From torture and mockery to mockery and torture

These forces—and those of the Iranian supported dictator himself Bashar al-Assad—stand accused of “a broad array of torture against their captives, including pipe beatings, whippings, electrocutions, acid burns, fingernail extractions.” According to Shiraz Maher, an expert on radicalization at Kings College: “It was physical torture mixed with a campaign to mock the core aspects of Sunni belief. That's what caught the attention and anger…..This is why the foreign fighter trend started from the Gulf and North Africa.” (pg. 135)

To be sure, corruption and wanton human rights abuses of the Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regimes of the Assad family in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq have played an undeniable role in fomenting Islamist groups of both sects—Sunni and Shiite. So did the pro-Shi'ite policies of former Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki which were exploited by jihadi terror groups. Other papers have also noted blowback from the Assad regime's funding and funneling of anti-coalition terrorist fighters into Iraq and elsewhere as well as connections of ousted Iraqi Ba-athist leaders connectionsto ISIS. (“Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” April 18 2015, Der Spiegel)

This is to say nothing of the ideology of the Islamic State, which overlap at its crudest with that of the Islamic Republic in sanctioning of the murders of Muslim apostates, Jews, homosexuals and repeated calls for the destruction of the United States.
The rise and growth of the Islamic State—beginning with the foundations of AQI and associated terror groups—would be hard to imagine without the initial Iranian-provided weapons, funds, and sanctuary for its founding father or the steady stream of Sunni recruits reacting to the rhetoric of sectarian holy war mouthed by Iranian-backed clerics. Such rhetoric, along with the anti-Sunni brutality of Iranian terror groups and Iranian-trained militias, has helped boost the Islamic State numbers in Syria and Iraq.
In May 2014, amidst battles between Iranian militias and ISIS and a break between ISIS and al-Qaeda, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani noted in a message to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri that their organization had not attacked Iran since its founding. Further, despite enduring allegations of collaboration with the Islamic Republic, the group had “refrained from targeting it” acting “upon the orders of al-Qaeda to safeguard its interests and supply lines in Iran.” The Islamic State spokesman proclaimed, “let history record that Iran owes al Qaeda invaluably.” (pg. 18-19)
It may also be said that the Islamic State owes the first Islamic Republic “invaluably”—and that people in the region and those in the West are paying immeasurably. Public understanding would be much better served by news media coverage that goes beyond the simplified narrative of Shi'ite Iran fighting the Sunni Islamic State.

Washington Institute: Καταριανοί ιδιώτες κάνουν δωρεές στον ISIS
Qatar and ISIS Funding: The U.S. Approach”, Αύγουστος 2014
1η έως 4η Παράγραφος
America views its close ally, Qatar, as a terrorist funding trouble spot. Washington has gone so far as to call the small Persian Gulf state a permissive environment for financing terrorist groups.
The United States says it does not have evidence that the government of Qatar is funding the terrorist group now known as the Islamic State (ISIS). But it does believe that private individuals in Qatar are helping to finance this group and others like it. And it thinks the Gulf state is not doing enough to stop this.
To influence Qatar's policies, the United States has employed a carrot-and-stick approach. It heaps praise on its ally for developing new anti-terrorist financing regulations, while privately discouraging and sometimes publicly admonishing its support for terrorist organizations.
Yet the fundamental problem is that America's counterterrorism agenda sometimes conflicts with what Qatar perceives to be its own political interests. Qatar's security strategy has been to provide support to a wide range of regional and international groups in order to bolster its position at home and abroad. This strategy has involved generously supporting Islamist organizations, including militant ones like Hamas and the Taliban. Allowing private local fundraising for Islamist groups abroad forms part of this approach. Closing channels of support to militant Islamists -- i.e., what Washington would like Doha to do -- would be inimical to Qatar's basic approach to its own security.

National Interest: Κάποιοι Αμερικανοί πιστεύουν ότι το Ιράν θα τους βοηθήσει να νικήσουν τον ISIS, ενώ στην πραγματικότητα το Ιράν θέλει να έχει υπό έλεγχο τον ISIS και όχι να τον νικήσει, γιατί ο ISIS δυσκολεύει τους Αμερικανούς να ανατρέψουν τον Άσαντ. Στο Ιράκ τα πράγματα είναι πιο πολύπλοκα για το Ιράν, γιατί το Ιράν δεν θέλει να αποκτήσει ο ISIS αρκετή δύναμη που θα του επιτρέψει να διεκδικήσει την επιρροή στο Ιράκ από το Ιράν στο μέλλον. Αλλά στο Ιράκ το Ιράν δεν τα έχει καταφέρει καλά όπως φάνηκε στην επαρχία al anbar. Οι καλύτεροι σύμμαχοι εναντίον του ISISείναι οι Σουνίτες Άραβες. Επίσης το Ιράν θέλει να διώξει τις ΗΠΑ από την Συρία και το Ιράκ, και επομένως μία λύση που θα δίνει πάτημα στις ΗΠΑ θα είναι πολύ κακή για το Ιράν.
“Sorry, AmericaIran Won't Defeat ISIS for You”, Ιούλιος 2015
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ISIS’s persistence has led some analysts to conclude—most recently Harvard’s Stephen Walt—that ISIS’s “state” will be a long-term reality in the region and one that Washington may soon have to come to terms with. From developing its own currency to managing a system of governance and terror wrapped in ideological fervidity, the Islamic State certainly has shown its resilience, despite its morphing geography since it captured Mosul in the summer of 2014.
Since the finalizing of the Iranian nuclear agreementIran has been touted in Washington in some policy circles as the best partner in fighting ISIS. Potential common interests between Washington and Tehran—as well as Iran’s military capabilities—could make Tehran an effective ally in rolling back ISIS at a time when the United States is wary to commit to another ground war in the Middle East. This assessment has three substantial blind spots:
First, Tehran’s strategy in Syria and Iraq has been focused more on containing and managing ISIS than defeating it. This strategy is driven by different considerations in both countries. In Syria, ISIS is seen as an effective tool in both weakening the U.S.- and GCC-backed opposition militias and buttressing the argument that President Assad is a most amenable alternative in Syria. Iraq, on the other hand, presents a difficult balancing act for Tehran that consists of both managing ISIS as a security threat to Iran’s heartland and Iraq’s Shi’a communities and avoiding empowering Sunni communities to such a degree that they could later pose a credible challenge to Iran’s influence in the Iraqi state. Tehran will prefer to keep Iraq unstable until its dominant influence is assured. Iran has been less than effective in pursuing this strategy as evidenced by its recent poor performance in Al Anbar Province and its difficult recapture of Tikrit in the spring.
Second, the best partners in defeating ISIS are Sunni Arab states and communities. ISIS’s resilience in the region has been sustained both by the effective use of military tactics and organizational strategy, but also, by a deepening ideological resonance amongst disenfranchised Sunnis in communities worldwide from Afghanistan to the banlieues ofParis. Without a sustained buy-in from leading Sunni states on both the governmental level and on the civil-society level to counter ISIS’s ideology, the Islamic State will continue to be a feature in the region’s body politic. As a senior Gulf official once noted, the responsibility of defeating ISIS isn’t an American or Iranian responsibility, but the responsibility of the Muslim community worldwide to reject this violence.
Third, Iran’s endgames in Iraq and Syria are in complete contrast to the United States’ objectives. While Washingtonand Tehran may share a few common interests in weakening ISIS, Tehran is seeking to both push the United States out of the region and to curtail the influence of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. A political solution in Syria or Iraq, which gives the United States and the GCC a further foothold in these states, would be an outcome that Iran would vigorously oppose.
Washington policymakers should be wary, then, of embracing Iran as such a partner as it considers recalibrating U.S.strategy in countering ISIS.

The Atlantic: Η αεροπορία του Άσαντ λειτούργησε ως η αεροπορία του ISISκαι βοήθησε τον ISIS να πάρει το Χαλέπι. Ο ISIS δεν προσπαθεί να ρίξει τον Ασαντ αλλά να φτιάξει το χαλιφάτο. Το 2014 που ξεκίνησε ο ISIS ήταν ένα δώρο για τον Άσαντ γιατί οι Ισλαμιστές έφευγαν από την Συρία και πήγαιναν στο Ιράκ. Ο Ομπάμα πρόσφατα είπε ότι δεν είναι ανάγκη να φύγει αμέσως ο Άσαντ, αλλάζοντας στάση. Το άρθρο παρομοιάζει την συμμαχία Άσαντ-ISISμε την συμμαχία Ναζί-Κομμουνιστών, και λέει ότι αργά ή γρήγορα θα μαχαιρώσουν ο ένας τον άλλο.
“Bashar al-Assad and the Devil’s Endgame”, Σεπτέμβριος 2015
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Assad’s plan, it seems, is to deliberately aid the rise of ISIS—what I call the devil’s gambit. The logic is simple and ruthless: radicalize the opposition so that the Syrian dictator looks like a lesser evil to domestic and foreign audiences. Here, Assad benefits from the inherently polarizing nature of civil war, as a cycle of atrocities and revenge pushes all sides to the extreme. He has further spurred radicalization by focusing the regime’s fire on moderate enemies, while reportedly releasing jihadists from jail and purchasing oil from ISIS. In recent months, the Syrian military allegedly used air strikes to help ISIS advance toward the city of Aleppo. Khaled Khoja, a Syrian opposition leader, claimed that Assad’s fighter jets were acting as “an air force for ISIS.”
In the widening gyre, the center cannot hold. Back in 2011, the relatively moderate Free Syrian Army seemed a plausible candidate to lead the resistance against Assad. Now the leading rebel factions include ISIS, the Islamic Front, and the al-Nusra Front, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda. The U.S. effort to train a moderate Syrian force has proved to be a pitiful and quixotic quest. After 10 months and millions of dollars, the United States has created a rebel army that is five strong. Not 5,000 strong, or 5 percent of the opposition. But literally five guys—barely enough to run a burger joint.
The tyrant and the terrorists have a symbiotic relationship. While ISIS rails against the secular regime, its focus is on building the caliphate, not getting rid of Assad. Meanwhile, ISIS’s advance in Iraq in 2014 was a godsend for the Syrian regime. The insurgents headed away from Damascus. And the group’s capture of the city of Mosul and much of Anbar province terrified the West. A reluctant Barack Obama could not accept the fall of Baghdad, and authorized extensive air strikes against ISIS.
The tyrant and the terrorists have a symbiotic relationship. While ISIS rails against the secular regime, its focus is on building the caliphate, not getting rid of Assad. Meanwhile, ISIS’s advance in Iraq in 2014 was a godsend for the Syrian regime. The insurgents headed away from Damascus. And the group’s capture of the city of Mosul and much of Anbar province terrified the West. A reluctant Barack Obama could not accept the fall of Baghdad, and authorized extensive air strikes against ISIS.
For both Western countries and Assad’s Alawite constituency at home, the choice is stark: the devil you know, or a pack of rapacious demons. If Assad were to fall, the chief beneficiary would be the very Islamist forces that the United States is bombing. To be reminded of the dangers of toppling a dictator, U.S. officials need only look to Libya, where the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011 led to anarchy. Assad is the TINA candidate: There is no alternative.
The devil’s gambit, then, appears to have succeeded. The Obama administrationhas recently backed away from insisting that Assad must relinquish power, and signaled instead that the dictator could stay in power for a transitional period as part of a peace settlement.
But the key word here is “appears.” As with the pact between the Nazis and the Soviets in 1939, the partners inSyria’s dance of death will happily stab each other when the moment is opportune.

The Atlantic: Ο Άσαντ βοηθάει τον ISIS μέχρι το σημείο που δεν γίνεται αρκετά ισχυρός για να τον χτυπήσει. Ο Άσαντ βοηθάει τον ISIS από την μία πλευρά, και από την άλλη προχωράει σε συμμαχία με την κυβέρνηση της Βαγδάτης εναντίον του. Αν ο ISIS αποκτήσει παραπάνω δύναμη απ’όση πρέπει ο Άσαντ θα τον χτυπήσει αλύπητα.
“Bashar al-Assad and the Devil's Gambit”, Ιούλιος 2014
10η , 11η , 12η Παράγραφος
For Assad, ISIS is priceless. The Sunni extremist boogeyman holds the key to his political survival. As ISIS continues its assault in Iraq, employing tactics that include beheadings, crucifixions, and systematic torture, Assad has cemented his alliance with Baghdad, as well as with Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.
Even Assad’s enemies are rethinking their strategy. European countries worry about the thousands of Europeans who have traveled to Syria to fight Assad—and their potential return as violent militants. Meanwhile, the United States has dispatched hundreds of advisors to join the battle against ISIS in Iraq. Members of the Obama administration are backing away from the goal of toppling Assad. “Anyone calling for regime change in Syria,” said one official, “is frankly blind to the past decade; and the collapse of eastern Syria, and growth of Jihadistan, leading to 30 to 50 suicide attacks a month in Iraq.”
The devil’s gambit is a chancy maneuver, since the resulting radicals could grow too powerful to control. For a dictator, the sweet spot is an extremist force that’s strong enough to inspire fear abroad, but not capable enough to topple the regime—which is roughly where ISIS is right now. If the militants become too potent, Assad will probably turn on them with a vengeance.

Telegraph: Το 2011 ο Άσαντ ελευθέρωσε από τις φυλακές του τους πιο επικίνδυνους τζιχαντιστές, οι οποίοι το 2013 πήραν της πετρελαιοπηγές της Συρίας και άρχισαν να του πουλάνε το πετρέλαιο τους. Ο Άσαντ δεν χτυπάει τους Ισλαμιστές, και οι μη Ισλαμιστές Σουνίτες θα μπορούσαν να τους χτυπήσουν αν δεν φοβόντουσαν τους βομβαρδισμούς του Άσαντ και της Ρωσίας.
“As long as there is an Assad, there will be an Isil - he'll make sure of it”,Δεκέμβριος 2015
2η , 3η Παράγραφος
So it is with Bashar al-Assad in Syria. From the very beginning of his country’s insurrection, Assad has done his best to help Islamist zealots hijack the Syrian opposition; he worked particularly hard to create ideal laboratory conditions for the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil). His supremely cynical aim was to convince the West to accept him as an essential bulwark against the very threat he helped to conjure into being. Put bluntly, Assad is an arsonist posing as a fireman.
This is an old trick. Every Arab dictator since Nasser has sought to confront his people and the world with a stark choice: either support me or watch the jihadists take over. The ruse is obvious, time-honoured – and remarkably effective.
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So for as long as there is an Assad, there will be an Isil. He will make sure of it. Why? Because for as long as there is an Isil, some in the West will argue that we need Assad to defeat it.
The conclusion should be obvious: the man who needs Isil more than anyone else is not best qualified to cause their demise. Assad’s role in engineering Isil’s ascendancy is well-documented. Back in 2011 and 2012, he emptied Sednaya prison outside Damascus of its most dangerous Islamist prisoners. He must have known that these outlaws would use their liberty to infect the rebels with the jihadist virus – and they duly did so. An excellent book, Isis: Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, names three Isil commanders who were carefully released from Assad’s jails.
Helped by the talent that the dictator had set free, Isil captured the oilfields of eastern Syria in 2013. But there is no point possessing oil unless you can sell the stuff. Fortunately for Isil, Assad bought their oil and funded their advance.
Today, Syria’s regime remains the largest single buyer of Isil’s oil and one of the biggest donors to the terrorists’ coffers. These facts are not seriously disputed, indeed the businessman accused of negotiating the oil deals between Isil and Assad – one George Haswani, the owner of HESCO engineering – has been named and subjected to EU sanctions.
Meanwhile, observers of the war have noticed a pattern. Assad strains every sinew to fight the non-Islamist rebels, but Isil has generally been immune from his barrel bombs and poison gas. Last year, only six per cent of Assad’s military operations targeted Isil, according to a study by IHS Jane’s, a defence consultancy. The other rebels felt the fury of 94 per cent of Assad’s military effort.
12η Παράγραφος
There is a bitter irony here. Without the threat posed by Assad’s forces and Russian air power, many Sunni rebels inSyria would indeed take up arms against Isil. The way to turn them against Isil would be to stop the depredations of Assad. So the idea that the dictator is indispensable to the fight against Isil is the exact reverse of the truth. In fact, getting rid of Assad would be the key that unlocks a Sunni army to defeat the terrorists.

Ο Άσαντ άδειασε τις φυλακές του από τους Ισλαμιστές και όταν πήραν τις πετρελαιοπηγές το 2013 άρχισε να αγοράζει το πετρέλαιο τους, και άρχισε και αυτός και ο ISIS να βομβαρδίζει τους αντάρτες του Free Syrian Army.
“How Assad helped the rise of his 'foe' Isil”, Αύγουστος 2014
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Logic would suggest that Mr Assad and Isil are out to destroy one another. But logic works in curious ways in theMiddle East. As he wages a ruthless struggle to hold power, the evidence suggests that Mr Assad has quietly cooperated with his supposed enemies and actively helped their rise.
The thinking behind this apparently perverse strategy is simple. Mr Assad wants to force his own people and the West to make an unpalatable choice: either he stays in place, or Syria falls into the hands of Isil's fanatics. When push comes to shove, Mr Assad thinks that most Syrians and the Western powers will back him over the fundamentalists.
But this plan will only work if Isil is the most powerful rebel force. The signs are that Mr Assad has done his best to make this come true.
As recently as 2012, Isil was a marginalised movement confined to a small area of Iraq. Then Mr Assad emptied Sednaya jail near Damascus of some of its most dangerous jihadist prisoners. If he hoped that these men would join Isil and strengthen its leadership, then that aspiration was certainly fulfilled. A number of figures in the movement's hierarchy are believed to be former inmates of Syrian prisons, carefully released by the regime.
By 2013, Isil had managed to capture oilfields in eastern Syria. But to profit from these assets, they needed to find a customer for the oil. Mr Assad's regime stepped in and began buying oil from Isil, thereby helping to fund the movement, according to Western and Middle Eastern governments.
Having provided Isil with talented commanders, courtesy of his prison amnesties, and filled its coffers with oil money, Mr Assad then chose to focus his military campaign on the non-Islamist rebels. Every town and suburb held by the Free Syrian Army was relentlessly pounded from the air and ground. A year ago, the regime even used poison gas against insurgent strongholds in Damascus.
10η Παράγραφος
The signs are that Isil has returned the favour. Instead of trying to bring down Mr Assad, Isil has concentrated on fighting the non-Islamist rebels. When the movement reached what may prove to be the apex of its military strength earlier this year, Isil did not advance on Damascus and try to overthrow the regime. Instead, it chose to invade northern Iraq and trigger the current crisis.

Ένας Ρώσος επιχειρηματίας με επαφές στον κύκλο του Πούτιν αγοράζει πετρέλαιο από τον ISIS
“An Energy Mogul Becomes Entangled With Islamic State”, Μάιος 2016
1η, 2η Παράγραφος
In Syria, George Haswani sees himself as a patriot. In the West, he is a wanted man.
Mr. Haswani acts as a middleman between Islamic State and the Syrian government, the terror group’s largest customer, Western security officials allege. Islamic State controls much of Syria’s energy infrastructure and sells stolen oil and natural gas at a discount—even to the regime it is ostensibly battling.
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Buttressing Mr. Hawsani are his strong ties to Russia. He teamed up years ago with one of President Vladimir Putin’s closest associates to build the sprawling gas-production facility in Syria’s Tuweinan region that caught the attention of the Obama administration.
Administration officials said Moscow’s military and economic alliance with Damascus makes it clear Russia knows of the dealings between the Assad regime and Islamic State.
13η Παράγραφος
Mr. Haswani built the Tuweinan gas facility in partnership with a company owned by Gennady Timchenko, a Russian businessman and confidante of Mr. Putin’s. Mr. Timchenko’s firm, OAO Stroytransgaz, has provided Russian engineers for the project over the past decade, the company said.
35η Παράγραφος
The U.S. has long accused Mr. Timchenko of serving as a front for the business interests of Mr. Putin, particularly in energy. Mr. Timchenko declined to comment. He has said in the past that he was a self-made businessman, independent of the Russian leader.
37η Παράγραφος
“Timchenko’s activities in the energy sector have been directly linked to Putin,” the Treasury Department said at the time.


Time: Ο Άσαντ φοβάται τον Free Syrian Army και την Al Nusra. Ο ISIS ποτέ δεν απείλησε πραγματικά τον Άσαντ. Αν ο Άσαντ ήθελε να εξολοθρεύσει τονISIS θα τον βομβάρδιζε. Ο Άσαντ όμως βομβαρδίζει τον Free Syrian Army. Όσο ο ISIS γίνεται ισχυρότερος τόσο οι ΗΠΑ ανησυχούν για τον ISIS και όχι για τον Άσαντ. Αν κάποια στιγμή ο ISIS εξολοθρεύσει την αντιπολίτευση, ο Άσαντ θα τον καθαρίσει αν τον αναγνωρίσει πρώτα η διεθνής κοινότητα.
“Why Bashar Assad Won’t Fight ISIS”, Φεβρουάριος 2015
2η Παράγραφος
The regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad has long had a pragmatic approach to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), says a Syrian businessman with close ties to the government. Even from the early days the regime purchased fuel from ISIS-controlled oil facilities, and it has maintained that relationship throughout the conflict. “Honestly speaking, the regime has always had dealings with ISIS, out of necessity.”
7η, 8η  , 9η , 10η Παράγραφος
Assad does not see ISIS as his primary problem, the businessman says. “The regime fears the Free Syrian Army and the Nusra Front, not ISIS. They [the FSA and Nusra] state their goal is to remove the President. But ISIS doesn’t say that. They have never directly threatened Damascus.” As the businessman notes, the strikes on ISIS targets are minimal. “If the regime were serious about getting rid of ISIS, they would have bombed Raqqa by now. Instead they bomb other cities, where the FSA is strong.” That said, the businessman does not believe that the regime has a formal relationship with ISIS, just a pragmatic one. “The more powerful ISIS grows, the more they are useful for the regime. They make America nervous, and the Americans in turn see the regime as a kind of bulwark against ISIS.”
A senior Western diplomat who specializes in the Syrian civil war agrees that ISIS is seen as an asset by Assad. “They will do whatever it takes to devalue the opposition, even if it means strengthening ISIS. They know that if it comes to choosing between the black flag [of ISIS] and Damascus, the international community will chooseDamascus.” And the strategy has worked extremely well. “The way it’s going now, it’s a matter of months, not even a year, that the moderate opposition is so weakened that it won’t be a factor anymore. So in just a few months from now the regime will be able to achieve its strategic goal of forcing the world to choose between Damascus and the black flags.”
So by ignoring the conflict between the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime to focus purely on ISIS may solve problems in the short term, says the diplomat, “but there will be more problems to come. These are the ingredients for a further escalation of the conflict — alienating large parts of the Sunni population, so that they have no choice but to join ISIS. Not for ideological reasons, but because they will do whatever it takes to overthrow the regime inDamascus.” Not only that, it will widen the geographical boundaries of the conflict by making this a fight of all Sunnis. “It’s a clear recipe for further escalation well beyond the geographical boundaries of the current conflict.”
However, Damascus believes that once it has neutralized most of the opposition, it can then defeat ISIS with ease. “ISIS alone, the regime can deal with them. What Assad wants is international recognition of his legitimacy as Syria’s President,” says the businessman. “When the war is over, he can easily handle ISIS with the help of Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.”



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